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Uniform Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”) Section 2-207 (section 2-207) affords
commercial law professors an opportunity to engage law students in statutory
interpretation.1 The section introduces students to the complexities and
ambiguities that often reside in statutes notwithstanding drafters’ best efforts to
achieve clarity. The study of section 2-207 also acquaints students with how
courts interpret the language of a U.C.C. provision that has been characterized
as a “quagmire,”2 “incomprehensible,”3 and a “statutory disaster whose every
word invites problems in construction,”4 and criticized for the waste resulting
from the litigation the section has spawned.5 An introduction of section 2-207
in law school also provides emergent commercial law attorneys with familiarity
that may be beneficial when they enter practice and tackle legal disputes or
structure sales transactions that implicate the section.
Indeed the idea for this Article originated in my teaching of section 2-207 in
a Contracts class. Students and I discussed Paul Gottlieb & Co. v. Alps South
Corp.,6 which addresses when a disclaimer of consequential damages clause on
the reverse side of a seller’s standardized form constitutes an additional term that
materially alters the parties’ agreement.7 The Gottlieb court stated that the
buyer, the party seeking to exclude the additional term from the contract, failed
to carry its burden to establish that the clause would materially alter the contract
if included, given that the buyer proffered no evidence of either surprise or
hardship.8

1. Daniel Keating, Exploring the Battle of the Forms in Action, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2678, 2679
(2000) (stating that section 2-207’s incomprehensible nature makes it an excellent, yet challenging
tool to teach about “intricacies of statutory construction”).
2. See Corneill A. Stephens, Escape from the Battle of the Forms: Keep it Simple, Stupid, 11
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 233, 234 (2007).
3. See Keating, supra note 1, at 2679.
4. Douglas G. Baird & Robert Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the Battle of the Forms: A
Reassessment of § 2-207, 68 VA. L. REV. 1217, 1224 (1982).
5. Id. at 1248.
6. 985 So. 2d 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
7. See id. at 4, 6.
8. Id. at 7–8.

2016]

When Does an Additional Term Materially Alter a Contract?

491

However, a student questioned the court’s holding. The student had assumed
that, given the importance of an aggrieved buyer’s recovery of consequential
damages, a disclaimer of such damages would constitute a per se material
alteration of the contract obviating the necessity of the court engaging in a factsbased analysis. Other students shared this view and extended their reasoning to
disclaimer of warranty provisions that frequently appear in a seller’s acceptance
or confirmation document. Certain students also expressed surprise that courts
would engage in fact-based analyses in determining the materiality of any
additional term that strips buyers of important rights implied into the party’s
contract by U.C.C. Article 2’s default rules. The students’ comments regarding
these and other clauses resulted in a lively discussion of incorrect assumptions
as to when an additional term materially alters a contract and the approaches
courts take when making this determination.
In an effort to provide some clarity on when an additional term constitutes a
material alteration, this Article examines ninety-four cases decided between
January 1, 2005 and July 1, 2015.9 The survey reveals that the nature and extent
of a court’s inquiry as to whether a provision materially alters an agreement turns
on several factors including: (1) the subject matter of the additional term; (2) the
test adopted for determining materiality; (3) the conduct of the parties,
particularly course of dealings; (4) whether the repetitive sending of forms gives
rise to a course of dealing; and (5) the language of Official Comments three,
four, and five to section 2-207.

9. The primary source for finding cases was Westlaw. Section 2-207 of the Uniform
Commercial Code Case Digest was also reviewed for cases discussing whether an additional term
materially altered the contract. Cases that discussed additional terms but did not engage in a section
2-207(2) analysis to determine whether an additional term should become a part of the contract
were not included in the ninety-four cases examined. Also, cases involving different rather than
additional terms were not included. Cases are grouped according to the nature of the additional
term that is at issue. In instances where a court examined more than one additional term (e.g.,
disclaimer of warranty and a limitation of remedy provisions), the cases are discussed in the section
of the article that examines each provision. These cases were only counted once, however, for
purposes of the total of ninety-four cases reviewed. Cases that were reviewed but are not discussed
in detail relate to indemnification, choice of law, non-assignment, statute of limitations, and
integration clauses. See, e.g., Carr v. Weinig, No. 5:01-CV-1514(HGM/GJD), 2006 WL 2355867,
at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2006) (discussing materiality of indemnification clause); Borden Chem.,
Inc. v. Jahn Foundry Corp., 834 N.E.2d 1227, 1230 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005) (discussing materiality
of indemnification clause); C9 Ventures v. SVC-West, L.P., 202 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 1487 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2012) (discussing materiality of indemnification clause); Greer v. T.F. Thompson & Sons,
Inc., No. CV-10-0799-PHX-SMM, 2011 WL 175889, at *3 (D. Ariz. Jan. 19, 2011) (discussing
choice of law provision); Trans-Tec Asia v. M/V Harmony Container, 435 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1017
(C.D. Cal. 2005), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 518 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2008) (discussing choice of
law provision); ISRA Vision, AG v. Burton Indus., Inc., 654 F. Supp. 2d 638, 647 (E.D. Mich.
2009) (addressing a non-assignment clause); Packgen v. Berry Plastics Corp., 973 F. Supp. 2d 48,
50 (D. Me. 2013) (addressing statute of limitations issue); Plastech Engineered Prods. v. Grand
Haven Plastics, Inc., No. 252532, 2005 WL 736519, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. March 31, 2005)
(addressing integration clause).
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Section I(A) of the Article provides an overview of section 2-207, beginning
with a discussion of the types of transactions in which battle-of-forms issues
invoke section 2-207. Section I(B) then examines contract formation under
section 2-207, focusing on the common law’s “mirror image” and “last shot”
rules that section 2-207 displaces.10 Section I(C) initially discusses sections 2207(2)(a) and (c), which govern the means by which an offeror can preclude the
incorporation into a contract of additional terms contained in an offeree’s
acceptance or confirmation.11 Section I(C) also establishes the predicate for a
discussion of section 2-207(2)(b) and the material alteration concept included
therein.
Part II begins with a discussion of the surprise or hardship test employed by
courts to determine if an additional term materially alters the contract. It is
followed by an attempt to define surprise and hardship. The Article then
discusses issues that emerge from the application of the surprise or hardship test,
including whether hardship is an independent test for determining materiality,
the role of course of dealing in determining materiality, and whether the repeated
sending of forms containing an additional term operates as a course of dealing
in regard to § 2-207(2)(b). Part II also summarizes the findings from the survey
of ninety-six cases decided over the last decade in which courts have addressed
when an additional term materially alters parties’ contract.12 The survey exposes
the inaccuracy of certain assumptions as to when an additional term will be
included or excluded from parties’ agreements. For example, arbitration and
disclaimer of warranty clauses do not constitute per se material alterations.13
Additional observations drawn from the survey include the: (1) adoption by
the majority of courts of the unreasonable surprise or hardship test to determine
materiality, notwithstanding arguments that hardship is a consequence of
surprise;14 (2) imposition of the burden of proving materiality on the party
seeking to exclude the additional term;15 (3) increased adoption and application
of a facts-based case-by-case approach, with limited exceptions, in assessing
materiality;16 (4) frequent application of course of dealings to negate surprise;17
and (5) a split among the jurisdictions on whether the repetitive sending of a
form containing the additional term gives rise to a course of dealing.18
Part III analyzes six clauses that frequently appear as additional terms in
acceptance and confirmation documents, which include: (1) arbitration;19 (2)
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

See infra Section I.B.
See infra Section I.C.
See infra Part II.
See infra text accompanying notes 200–03.
See infra Section II.A.
See infra text accompanying notes 106–10.
See infra text accompanying notes 163–66.
See infra text accompanying notes 115–18.
See infra text accompanying notes 154–61.
See infra Section III.A.
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disclaimer of warranties;20 (3) limitation of remedies, including consequential
damages;21 (4) forum selection;22 (5) attorney’s fees;23 and (6) pre-judgment
interest upon a buyer’s default.24 The survey concludes that, except for forum
selection and pre-judgment interest clauses, courts have gravitated toward
rejecting a per se approach in favor of a case-by-case approach in which the facts
of a particular case are assessed in determining unreasonable surprise or
hardship.25 It also reveals that most courts wisely refrain from strictly adhering
to the guidance set forth in comments 4 and 5 of section 2-207, which pertain to
when a clause is likely or unlikely to materially alter.26
I. OVERVIEW OF SECTION 2-207
A. The Applicability of Section 2-207
Section 2-207 was drafted for a world of contracting that relies largely on
contract formation arising from an exchange between parties of standardized
form documents rather than parties sitting down and hammering out the terms
of their contract and signing a single document.27 This is due in part to the reality
that contracting for goods often occurs quickly and involves repeated sales and
purchases of similar goods between parties who are at a distance.28 Section 2207 was promulgated, in part, to attempt to deal with these realities.29
Contractual behavior that invokes section 2-207 might resemble the
following. A buyer sends to a supplier an email containing a request for
proposals. The supplier responds by emailing a price quote, which typically will
not constitute an offer.30 Under this scenario, an offer would arise when the
buyer emails or otherwise communicates a purchase order in response to the
supplier’s price quote. The buyer’s purchase order will likely consist of a form

20. See infra Section III.B.
21. See infra Section III.C.
22. See infra Section III.E.
23. See infra Section III.D.2.
24. See infra Section III.D.1.
25. See infra Part IV.
26. See id.
27. See Robert P. Wise, Finding the Mississippi UCC Sales Contract Amid the RFQ, Quotes,
Phone Calls, Emails, Purchase Order and Acknowledgment Forms, 30 MISS. C. L. REV. 491, 496
(2012) (noting that modern contract formation “depends on an informal exchange of forms”).
28. See id.
29. See Keating, supra note 1, at 2682.
30. Nordyne, Inc. v. Int’l Controls & Measurements Corp., 262 F.3d 843, 846 (8th Cir. 2001)
(finding that a price quote will only constitute an offer when it’s made sufficiently clear that its
acceptance will form a contract); James G. Raphelson & Jane D. Quasarano, Dueling, Dickering,
and Delivering: UCC Battle of the Forms in Manufacturing Contracts, 93 MICH. B.J., no. 10, Oct.
2014, at 29 (noting that absent specific circumstances, such as a price quote that contains specific
quantities and an indication that it’s for the buyer’s immediate acceptance, price quotes are typically
construed as an invitation for an offer rather than an offer); Wise, supra note 27, at 497.
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document that contains “dickered” terms, which are the “essential terms over
which” the parties expressly negotiate,31 such as the identification of the product,
quantity, price, and delivery terms.32 The purchase order would also likely
contain preprinted standard terms, “boilerplate” provisions,33 relating to a range
of matters, such as warranties and remedies.34
In response to the buyer’s purchase order, the seller might send an
acknowledgement, invoice, or another standardized form document that
contains dickered terms that match those contained in the buyer’s purchase
order.35 The seller will likely attempt, however, to add terms to the transaction.
To accomplish this, the seller’s acknowledgment form or invoice will include
boilerplate provisions relating to a range of matters, such as attorney’s fees in
the event of the buyer’s nonpayment, mandatory arbitration, and disclaimers of
implied warranties and consequential damages.36 As discussed infra, under
section 2-207, the exchange of forms constitutes a contract between the parties.37
Of course, section 2-207 governs transactions that do not track the contracting
behavior described above. In addition to the above scenario, a seller might begin
the process by communicating numerous quotations to potential buyers.38
Section 2-207 is also relevant where the supplier sends the first form (e.g., an
acknowledgement), which creates an offer that the buyer accepts by sending a
purchase order. Similarly, section 2-207 will apply where parties reach an oral
agreement that is followed by one or both of the parties sending confirmations.39
Although the courts are split, some courts hold that section 2-207 applies where
a seller responds to a buyer’s purchase order by shipping the goods with an
31. See Stephens, supra note 2, at 236.
32. See Wise, supra note 27, at 496 (stating that once the buyer receives the seller’s price
quote, the buyer will issue a more detailed purchase order by adding terms relating to product
options, price, delivery dates, or industry standards in an attempt to specify the buyer’s expectations
regarding the seller’s performance).
33. See Stephens, supra note 2, at 236.
34. See id.
35. Wise, supra note 27, at 496. Buyers typically send the form document, which is a
purchase order, and sellers can respond with an acknowledgment or invoice. Id. Courts have
provided examples of what is and is not a dickered term. See, e.g., General Electric Co. v. G.
Siempelkamp GmbH & Co., 29 F.3d 1095, 1098–99 (6th Cir. 1994); Gardner Zemke Co. v.
Dunham Bush, Inc., 850 P.2d 319, 323–24 (N.M. 1993).
36. Wise, supra note 27, at 496.
37. See infra text accompanying notes 58–59.
38. See Wise, supra note 27, at 498.
39. U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002). Section 2-207(1) reads
in its entirety as follows:
A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation which is sent
within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it states terms additional
to or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made
conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.
Id.; see also Cent. Bag Co. v. W. Scott & Co., 647 S.W.2d 828, 830 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Sw.
Eng’g Co. v. Martin Tractor Co., 473 P.2d 18, 26 (Kan. 1970).

2016]

When Does an Additional Term Materially Alter a Contract?

495

acknowledgment form or invoice that either accompanies the shipment of goods
or is sent shortly after the goods are shipped.40 In addition, section 2-207 applies
where one party makes an oral offer to which the recipient responds by
forwarding a standardized form that constitutes an acceptance.41 Moreover,
instead of the parties exchanging their documents by email with forms attached,
one or both of the parties may include in their emails links to sites containing
their respective terms and conditions.42 Finally, contract formation may occur
by virtue of an electronic data interchange (“EDI”).43 Notwithstanding the
precise way in which documents are communicated between the parties, section
2-207’s rules governing contract formation may be pertinent. Equally relevant
are the section’s rules that determine the terms governing the parties’ contract.44
B. Section 2-207 and Contract Formation
1. The Common Law’s “Mirror Image” and “Last Shot” Rules
Section 2-207 was promulgated with the intention of changing the common
law approach to both the formation and terms of a contract entered into through
the use of standardized forms.45 In regard to contract formation, section 2-207
altered what was characterized as the common law’s “mirror image rule.”46
Under this rule, unless the terms of the offer and the purported acceptance
matched (i.e., the terms of the offer were the “mirror image” of the purported
acceptance), no contract was formed.47 To illustrate, assume that a buyer sent a
purchase order and the seller responded with an acknowledgment. The dickered
terms of the seller’s acknowledgment matched the dickered terms of the buyer’s
offer but the seller’s boilerplate terms included a disclaimer of warranties, a
matter not addressed in the buyer’s offer. Under the common law mirror image
rule, the seller’s acknowledgement gave rise to a counteroffer.48 In this scenario
and the scenario detailed below, section 2-207 alters the common law approach

40. Rocheux Int’l of N.J., Inc. v. U.S. Merchants Fin. Grp., Inc., 741 F. Supp. 2d 651, 678
(D.N.J. 2010) (acknowledging cases in which transactions were consummated in this fashion and
the split among the jurisdictions on this issue).
41. Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161, 1163–66 (6th Cir. 1972); Apex LLC
v. Sharing World, Inc., 206 Cal. App. 4th 999, 1011 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012).
42. See, e.g., Leica Geosystems, Inc. v. L.W.S. Leasing, Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1196 (D.
Colo. 2012) (illustrating a scenario where a document contained links to terms and conditions on a
website).
43. See generally Stephens, supra note 2, at 235 (noting the standard form documents now
appear in both electronic and paper media).
44. U.C.C. § 2-207(2), (3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
45. Keating, supra note 1, at 2682–83 (stating section 2-207 deals with whether and when
contract formation occurred, as well as which party’s non-immediate terms control).
46. Id. at 2684.
47. Stephens, supra note 2, at 237.
48. See, e.g., Poel v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 110 N.E. 619, 620 (N.Y. 1915).
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by making the seller’s acknowledgement an acceptance rather than a
counteroffer.49
Section 2-207 also sought to alter a common consequence of the mirror image
rule—the “last shot rule.”50 Consider the above illustration. Assume that the
seller sent their acknowledgment and then shipped the goods, which the buyer
received, accepted, and paid for. Under the common law, a contract was formed
pursuant to the buyer’s conduct in having accepted the goods and, in turn, the
seller’s counteroffer.51 Having accepted the seller’s counteroffer through their
acceptance of the goods, the buyer was bound by the terms set forth in the
seller’s acknowledgment form notwithstanding a lack of awareness of the
boilerplate terms.52 Under the common law’s last shot rule, the party who sent
the last form, often the seller, dictates the terms governing the transaction.53
2. Displacing the “Mirror Image” and “Last Shot” Rules
The changes wrought by section 2-207 were intended to address concerns that
the common law’s mirror image and last shot rules permitted a party to renege
on what both parties believed constituted their contract54 and the unfairness of
permitting the party who sent the last form to control the terms of the contract
given the absence of an agreement in fact on those terms.55 Therefore section 2207 was intended to address the last shot rule’s tendency to ignore the actual
bargain into which the parties had entered.56 Section 2-207 was promulgated

49. Brown Mach. v. Hercules, Inc., 770 S.W.2d 416, 420–21 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
50. See Stephens, supra note 2, at 237–38.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 238.
53. Caroline N. Brown, Restoring Peace in the Battle of the Forms: A Framework for Making
the Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-207 Work, 69 N.C. L. REV. 893, 902 (1991) (noting that
under the common law rule, the offeree became the master of the commercial contract created
pursuant to an exchange of forms).
54. Keating, supra note 1, at 2684 (“Because a purported acceptance such as the seller’s is
treated as a counteroffer that is then accepted by the buyer’s performance, the seller’s terms will
govern by virtue of its having fired the ‘last shot.’”).
55. Keating, supra note 1, at 2684. Professor Keating also argues that the common law
approach to the battle of the forms
turns contract law on its head. This is a deal in which the parties recklessly, if not,
knowingly, consummate a sale of goods without having settled on all of the terms. And
while one could argue that every contract is incomplete at some level, what distinguishes
the battle of the forms case is that these contracts are most often incomplete at very
fundamental levels.
Id. at 2679; see also Stephens, supra note 2, at 239 (arguing that the last shot rule encourages parties
to engage in gamesmanship and bounds parties to unread terms that both parties had often ignored,
thereby forcing an agreement on them to which neither had agreed).
56. Brown, supra note 53, at 899 (noting that section 2-207 fosters the U.C.C.’s broad policy
of effectuating the intent of parties and removing technical rules that inhibit that policy); Stephens,
supra note 2, at 240.
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with the intent of fostering the bargain in fact between the parties and to conform
to commercial realities.57
Section 2-207(1) displaces the common law’s mirror image rule by allowing
an offeree’s responsive document to constitute an acceptance, even though the
boilerplate terms therein are not identical to the terms of the offer.58 Returning
to our scenario, under section 2-207, rather than giving rise to a counteroffer, the
seller’s acknowledgment would constitute an acceptance.59 If a buyer’s offer is
silent as to certain matters, additional terms, such as arbitration and disclaimer
of warranties provisions appearing in the seller’s acknowledgment, will not
defeat contract formation.60 The same would not be true if the offer contains
dickered terms not addressed in the acceptance. An acceptance by stating “yes”
is assent to all of the offer’s terms, even if not repeated in the acceptance.61
Therefore, additional terms only implicate section 2-207 when they appear in
the acceptance or confirmation. Moreover, the seller’s acknowledgment
constitutes an acceptance of the buyer’s purchase order even if the boilerplate
terms of the parties’ respective documents differ.62 Consequently, if a buyer’s
purchase order contains a provision not allowing for arbitration and the seller’s
acknowledgment contains boilerplate language allowing for arbitration, a
contract would be formed notwithstanding the presence of conflicting (i.e.,
different) boilerplate terms.63
Section 2-207 does not, however, abrogate the parties’ ability to create a
counteroffer.64 Under section 2-207, nonmatching dickered terms alone are not
enough to prevent a “definite and seasonable expression of acceptance” unless
at least one of the parties’ dickered terms diverges significantly65 and, therefore,

57. Brown, supra note 53, at 895–96 (arguing that section 2-207 removes common law
barriers to assessing parties’ objective manifestations of assent); Colin P. Marks, The Limits of
Limiting Liability in the Battle of the Forms: UCC Section 2-207 and the “Material Alteration”
Inquiry, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 501, 510 (2006) (arguing that the primary purpose of section 2-207(1) is
to prevent minor discrepancies in an offer and acceptance from giving rise to a counteroffer that
could provide a basis for a party to renege on a contract).
58. Keating, supra note 1, at 2684 (stating that section 2-207(1) effectively finished the
common law mirror image rule); Stephens, supra note 2, at 242.
59. Brown Mach., Inc. v. Hercules, Inc., 770 S.W.2d 416, 420 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
60. Id. at 420–21; Hitchiner Mfg. Co. v. Modern Indus., Inc., No. 09-cv-242-PB, 2009 WL
3643471, at *3–4 (D.N.H. Oct. 29, 2009).
61. See Brown, 770 S.W.2d at 420–21.
62. U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002); see also RBC Aircraft
Prods., Inc. v. Precise Machining & Mfg., LLC, 26 F. Supp. 3d 156, 176 (D. Conn. 2014) aff’d in
part, vacated in part, No. 14-2911, 2015 WL 6875006 (2d Cir. Nov. 10, 2015); Brown, 770 S.W.2d
at 420.
63. See Northrop Corp. v. Litronic Indus., 29 F.3d 1173, 1175 (7th Cir. 1994); ConocoPhillips
Alaska, Inc. v. Williams Alaska Petroleum, Inc., 322 P.3d 114, 128 (Alaska 2014).
64. See U.C.C. § 2-207 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
65. Id.
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will not result in contract formation.66 Thus, if a buyer and seller’s standardized
forms contain conflicting price terms, the seller’s response to the buyer’s offer
is a counteroffer because there is no seasonable expression of assent.67 In other
words, generally courts have found that no contract is formed pursuant to the
exchange of forms if the dickered terms of the offer and purported acceptance
do not match in ways that matter to the parties.68
Subsection 2-207(1) provides the parties another means by which to create a
counteroffer and negate contract formation pursuant to an exchange of forms.69
The subsection states that notwithstanding additional or different terms in the
offeree’s document, a contract will be formed “unless acceptance is expressly
made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.”70 In order for
language to give rise to a conditional acceptance, it must clearly indicate the
offeree’s unwillingness to proceed with the deal unless the offeror assents to the
additional or different terms in the offeree’s form.71 Generally, courts find that
language in the offeree’s form that mirrors the language of the conditional
acceptance provision of section 2-207(1) operates as a counteroffer rather than
an acceptance.72 To avoid formalistic determinations that would be inconsistent
with the U.C.C.’s goal of construing its provisions liberally,73 however,
language can operate as a conditional acceptance even if it does not perfectly
track the conditional acceptance provision, so long as it places the offeror on
unambiguous notice that the offeree’s acceptance documents and terms therein
create a counteroffer rather than an acceptance.74
To reiterate, conditional acceptance language creates a counteroffer.75
Assume a buyer emails a purchase order to a seller. The seller responds by
emailing its acknowledgement to the buyer. The seller’s document states that
66. U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Semco Mfg., Inc., 562 F.2d 1061, 1067 (8th Cir. 1977); Howard
Constr., Co. v. Jeff-Cole Quarries, Inc., 669 S.W.2d 221, 229 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
67. Gage Prods. Co. v. Henkel Corp., 393 F.3d 629, 637–38 (6th Cir. 2004); Laforce, Inc. v.
Pioneer Gen. Contractors, Inc., No. 299848, 2011 WL 4467762, at *5–6 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 27,
2011); U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(b) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
68. Gen. Elec. Co. v. G. Siempelkamp GmbH & Co., 29 F.3d 1095, 1099 (6th Cir. 1994);
Laforce, 2011 WL 4467762, at *5; Keating, supra note 1, at 2685 (noting that a divergence in the
dickered terms of the offer and purported acceptance creates a counteroffer rather than an
acceptance); Raphelson & Quasarano, supra note 30, at 30.
69. U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
70. Id. (emphasis added).
71. See, e.g., Walter Toebe Constr. Co. v. Kard Welding, Inc., No. 05-73605, 2008 WL
220620, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 25, 2008).
72. See, e.g., PCS Nitrogen Fertilizer, L.P. v. Christy Refractories, L.L.C., 225 F.3d 974, 979
(8th Cir. 2000); Scientific Components Corp. v. ISIS Surface Mounting, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 653,
657–58 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
73. White Consol. Indus., Inc. v. McGill Mfg. Co., 165 F.3d 1185, 1191 (8th Cir. 1999).
74. Vicor Corp. v. Concurrent Computer Corp., No. 051437A, 2006 WL 1047522, at *4
(Mass. Supp. Mar. 6, 2006) (quoting JOM, Inc. v. Adell Plastics, Inc., 193 F.3d 47, 53 (1st Cir.
1999)).
75. Walter Toebe, 2008 WL 220620, at *2.
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the seller’s acceptance of the terms of the buyer’s purchase order are expressly
conditioned on the buyer’s assent to the terms and conditions contained in the
seller’s acknowledgment. The seller’s sending of an acknowledgment
containing such language constitutes a counteroffer.76 A contract arises pursuant
to the parties’ exchange of forms only if the buyer expressly assents to the terms
set forth in the seller’s acknowledgment (counteroffer).77 Therefore, the buyer’s
mere payment for the goods would not constitute assent by the buyer to the terms
and conditions contained in the seller’s acknowledgment. The seller’s shipment
and the buyer’s acceptance of and payment for the goods will, however, give
rise to a contract pursuant to conduct which is governed by section 2-207(3).78
Thus section 2-207(3) is invoked when the parties’ documents fail to give rise
to a contract usually because a conditional acceptance is not expressly agreed to
by the initial offeror, but the parties nevertheless engage in conduct evidencing
a contract.79 In such an instance, the terms of the resulting contract consist of
the terms in which the parties’ forms are in agreement and U.C.C. Article 2 gap
filler terms.80
C. Governing Terms Under Section 2-207: Displacing the Last Shot Rule
As it relates to which party’s terms should govern, section 2-207 was premised
on the assumption that parties do not read the standardized pre-printed terms
contained in the other party’s standardized form.81 Although research has

76. Brown, supra note 53, at 921 (“The proviso’s role is to ensure that no acceptance will be
found where there are other facts unambiguously negating the inference that the form has been used
as an acceptance. An effective manifestation of the offeree’s intent not to accept negates the form’s
usual meaning as a ‘definite and seasonable expression of acceptance’ and renders the offeree’s
response a counter offer”); Keating, supra note 1, at 2685 (noting that the offeree’s use of
conditional acceptance language demonstrates the offeree’s intent not to be bound unless the offeror
specifically assents to the additional or different terms in the offeree’s document).
77. PCS Nitrogen Fertilizer, L.P. v. Christy Refractories, L.L.C., 225 F.3d 974, 979–80 (8th
Cir. 2000); Curwood Inc. v. Prodo-Pak Corp., No. 07-C-544, 2008 WL 644884, at *3 (E.D. Wis.
Mar. 7, 2008).
78. Stemcor USA, Inc. v. Trident Steel Corp., 471 F. Supp. 2d 362, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(stating that a contract can be formed under section 2-207(3) pursuant to conduct where the parties’
forms fail to consummate a contract); U.C.C. § 2-207(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N
2002).
79. Scientific Components Corp. v. ISIS Surface Mounting, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 653, 658
(E.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that a contract can be formed under section 2-207(3) notwithstanding the
failure of a contract to arise pursuant to an exchange of forms because of conditional acceptance
language contained in offeree’s form); U.C.C. § 2-207(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N
2002).
80. Textile Unlimited, Inc. v. ABMH & Co., 240 F.3d 781, 788 (9th Cir. 2001); PremixMarbletite Mfg. Corp. v. SKW Chemicals, Inc., 145 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1355 (S.D. Fla. 2001);
U.C.C. § 2-207(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
81. See Stephens, supra note 2, at 236 (explaining that parties are generally ignorant of the
boilerplate language contained in the other party’s standardized document).
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questioned this assumption,82 judicial decisions appear to continue to accept its
accuracy.83
As discussed above, section 2-207 was intended to alter the “last shot” rule
under which the terms of the last party to send a document controlled the terms
of a resulting agreement.84 Under section 2-207, the seller’s sending of its
acknowledgment form accepts the buyer’s offer, but the buyer’s acceptance of
the goods does not constitute assent to the additional boilerplate terms contained
in the seller’s acknowledgment.85 Of course, a party’s express assent to an
additional term, such as the offeror signing the offeree’s form, would bind the
offeror to the additional terms because the additional term is an offer to modify
the already formed contract, and the offeror is assenting to the offer to modify.86
1. The Offeror’s Power to Object Under Sections 2-207(2)(a) and (c)
Section 2-207(2) allows an offeror to take affirmative steps to exclude
additional boilerplate terms included in the offeree’s acceptance or confirmation.
Subsection (2) provides:
The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to
the contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the
contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the
offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given
or is given within a reasonable time after notice of them is
received.87
Thus, subsections 2-207(2)(a) and (c) grant the offeror the limited power to set
the terms of the agreement.88 Under 2-207(2)(a), an offeror can make an
advance objection to any additional terms contained in the offeree’s acceptance
or confirmation.89 Subsection 2-207(2)(c) authorizes an offeror to object to
82. See Keating, supra note 1, at 2703–04.
83. See id. at 2682–83.
84. See id. at 2684.
85. PCS Nitrogen Fertilizer, L.P. v. Christy Refractories, L.L.C., 225 F.3d 974, 980 (8th Cir.
2000); Stephen W. Ranere, Charting A Course: How Courts Should Interpret Course of Dealing in
a Battle-of-Forms Dispute, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 671, 681 (2008).
86. C9 Ventures v. SVC-W., L.P., 202 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 1500 (Cal. App. Ct. 2012); Ranere,
supra note 85, at 681.
87. U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
88. Marks, supra note 57, at 511 (stating that sections 2-207(2)(a) and (b) reserves to the
offeror the power to set terms by objecting to additional terms “before or after the fact”).
89. Chainworks, Inc. v. Webco Indus., Inc., No. 1:05-CV-135, 2006 WL 461251, at *7 (W.D.
Mich. Feb. 24, 2006); Stemcor USA, Inc. v. Trident Steel Corp., 471 F. Supp. 2d 362, 369
(S.D.N.Y. 2006); U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002); Marks,
supra note 57, at 511.

2016]

When Does an Additional Term Materially Alter a Contract?

501

additional terms after receiving the document containing an additional term.90
The offeror’s objection to additional terms within a reasonable time after having
received the offeree’s acceptance or other document prevents additional terms
from becoming a part of the parties’ agreement.91 The same rule would apply
where additional boilerplate terms are contained in a confirmation rather than an
acceptance.92
2. Section 2-207(2)(b): Material Alterations of the Agreement
Section 2-207(2) gives the offeree limited latitude to add to the terms set forth
in the offeror’s document. As discussed above, this power is circumscribed
where the offeror objects to the additional terms either before or after receiving
the offeree’s acceptance.93 Subsection 2-207(2)(b) protects the offeror who fails
to object as provided in sections 2-207(2)(a) & (c) by preventing the offeror from
being “burdened with any substantial or material additions to the risk
contemplated by the offer.”94 As articulated in comment four to section 2-207,
the primary function of subsection (2)(b) is the “avoidance of oppression and
unfair surprise.”95 If an additional term is one that materially alters the parties’
contract, it will be excluded as a term of the parties’ agreement.96 To summarize,
the offeree’s power to set terms is circumscribed where an additional term in an
offeree’s acceptance document materially changes the bargain as proposed in
the offer.97
The text of section 2-207(2)(b) fails to define when an additional term
constitutes a material alteration.98 Nonbinding guidance is found, however, in
comment four of section 2-207. 99 Comment four defines material alteration as
when the clause would “result in surprise or hardship if incorporated without
express awareness by the other party. . . .”100 Comment five speaks of
90. U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(c) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
91. Gen. Steel Corp. v. Collins, 196 S.W.3d 18, 22 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006); U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(c)
(AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002); Marks, supra note 57, at 511.
92. John E. Murray, The Definitive “Battle of the Forms”: Chaos Revisited, 20 J.L. & COM.
1, 22 (2000).
93. See supra text accompanying notes 87–92.
94. Murray, supra note 92, at 8–9.
95. Id. at 9; U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 4 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
96. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 3 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
97. Brown, supra note 53, at 928.
98. See U.C.C. § 2-207 (2) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
99. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 4 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
100. Id. Comment four reads in its entirety as follows:
Examples of typical clauses which would normally “materially alter” the contract and so
result in surprise or hardship if incorporated without express awareness by the other party
are: a clause negating such standard warranties as that of merchantability or fitness for a
particular purpose in circumstances in which either warranty normally attaches; a clause
requiring a guaranty of 90% or 100% deliveries in a case such as a contract by cannery,
where the usage of the trade allows greater quantity leeway; a clause reserving to the seller
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“unreasonable surprise.”101 Comment four provides examples of additional
terms that “would normally ‘materially alter’ the contract,” including
disclaimers of U.C.C. Article 2’s implied warranties of merchantability and
fitness for particular purpose.102 Comment five identifies additional terms that
“involve no element of unreasonable surprise,” including clauses providing for
the payment of interest on overdue accounts and reasonable limits on remedies
in the event of breach.103
A critical question that emerges from the materiality standard and the
illustrations in comments four and five is the extent to which courts have adopted
the standards in the comments.104 As one commentator noted:
The difficulty of using examples to define material alteration is its
tendency to lead to per se rules. Ignored by section 2-207 is the fact
that what is or is not a material alteration is dependent upon a number
of factors and variables, including the value of the transaction, the
quantity involved in the transaction, the relationship of the parties to
each other, the custom and usage of trade, and the course of dealing
and course of performance between the parties. Only by considering
all of the above factors can a court make a determination whether a
term is truly a material alteration.105
This Article will now focus on how courts have interpreted and applied section
2-207(2)(b)’s material alteration standard and the variables that influence their
decision-making.

the power to cancel upon the buyer’s failure to meet any invoice when due; a clause requiring
that complaints be made in a time materially shorter than customary or reasonable.
Id.
101. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 5 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
102. Id. at cmt. 4.
103. Id. at cmt. 5. Comment five reads in its entirety as follows:
Examples of clauses which involve no element of unreasonable surprise and which therefore
are to be incorporated in the contract unless notice of objection is seasonably given are: a
clause setting forth and perhaps enlarging slightly upon the seller’s exemption due to
supervening causes beyond his control, similar to those covered by the provision of this
Article on merchant’s excuse by failure of presupposed conditions or a clause fixing in
advance any reasonable formula of proration under such circumstances; a clause fixing a
reasonable time for complaints within customary limits, or in the case of a purchase for subsale, providing for inspection by the sub-purchaser; a clause providing for interest on
overdue invoices or fixing the seller’s standard credit terms where they are within the range
of trade practice and do not limit any credit bargained for; a clause limiting the right of
rejection for defects which fall within the customary trade tolerances for acceptance “with
adjustment” or otherwise limiting remedy in a reasonable manner. . . .
Id.
104. See Stephens, supra note 2, at 248. Unless the U.C.C. comments are enacted by a state
legislature, they are mere commentary and secondary authority. See generally Baird & Weisberg,
supra note 4, at 1227–28. Thus, the only way a comment attains primary authority is when a court
uses the comment. See generally Ranere, supra note 85, at 680.
105. Stephens, supra note 2, at 248.
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II. MATERIAL ALTERATION: OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS
The author reviewed ninety-four judicial opinions released between January
1, 2005 and July 1, 2015. Included are decisions from federal district and
appellate courts, as well as state trial and appellate courts. These cases provide
insight into how courts decide when it is appropriate to incorporate, as an
additional term, one or more of the following clauses into the parties’ agreement:
(1) arbitration; (2) warranty disclaimer; (3) limited remedies, including
disclaimers of consequential damages; (4) pre-judgment interest; (5) attorney’s
fees; and, (6) forum selection.
A. The Surprise or Hardship Test
Several generalizations can be gleaned from the cases reviewed. Courts
impose the burden of establishing a material alteration on the non-assenting
party who is objecting to the inclusion of the additional term.106 To satisfy its
burden, most jurisdictions require the non-assenting party to prove that
incorporating an additional term into the parties’ agreement will result in
surprise or hardship to the non-assenting party. In Dumont Telephone Co. v.
Power & Telephone Supply, Co.,107 the court stated, “A clause will be held to
‘materially alter’ a contract when it would ‘result in surprise or hardship if
incorporated without the express awareness of the other party.’”108 A surprise
or hardship test was also adopted in Leica Geosys., Inc. v. L.W.S. Leasing, Inc.109
The court relied on comment four to section 2-207 in stating that additional terms
materially alter an agreement when they “result in surprise or hardship if
incorporated without express awareness by the other party.”110
1. Unreasonable Surprise
As a guide for determining the presence of unreasonable surprise, many courts
articulate a general standard derived from the language of comments four and
five to section 2-207. The court in Carr v. Michael Weinig, AG111 expressed this
standard: “To carry the burden of showing surprise, a party must establish that,
under the circumstances, it cannot be presumed that a reasonable merchant
would have consented to the additional term.”112 Courts also characterize
unreasonable surprise as comprising “both the subjective element of what a party

106. See, e.g., Bayway Ref. Co. v. Oxygenated Mktg. & Trading A.G., 215 F.3d 219, 221 (2d
Cir. 2000).
107. 962 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (N.D. Iowa).
108. Id. at 1078 (assessing whether an arbitration provision constitutes a material alteration of
the parties’ contract).
109. 872 F. Supp. 2d 1191 (D. Colo. 2012).
110. Id. at 1200 (assessing whether including limitation of remedies, disclaimer of warranty,
and choice of law provisions in the parties’ contract would materially alter the agreement).
111. 2006 WL 2355867 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2006).
112. Id. at *5.
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actually knew and the objective element of what a party should have known.”113
Based on this view, courts rule that a non-assenting party’s “profession of
surprise is insufficient to establish surprise unless the non-assenting party can
also ‘establish that, under the circumstances, it cannot be presumed that a
reasonable merchant would have consented to the additional term.’”114 Having
articulated a general standard, courts then examine the factual circumstances
surrounding the disputed transaction, particularly course of dealing and trade
usage (the relevance of which are discussed below), to determine if the inclusion
of the additional term into the contract will amount to unreasonable surprise.115
Some courts identify a list of factors that would guide their analysis in
assessing unreasonable surprise. In ISRA Vision AG v. Burton Industries, Inc.,116
the court adopted the surprise or hardship test of materiality.117 Discussing
unfair surprise, the court identified the following factors as salient in
determining whether a non-assenting party was unreasonably surprised: (1)
course of dealing; (2) trade usage; (3) the number of form documents exchanged;
(4) the conspicuousness of the additional term; and (5) whether the party
objecting to the inclusion of the additional term includes the term in its
standardized forms.118
2. Hardship
a. Defining Hardship
When addressing hardship, courts have generally defined it as substantial
economic hardship. In ISRA Vision, the court stated hardship exists where “the
clause at issue would impose substantial economic hardship on the nonassenting
party.”119 A clause that “creates or allocates an open-ended or prolonged
liability” is often provided as an example of substantial economic hardship.120
Discussing the materiality of an indemnification provision as an additional term,
a court stated: “A shift in legal liability which has the effect of relieving one
party of the potential for economic hardship and placing this burden upon
another party is an important term in any contract.”121

113. Bayway Ref. Co. v. Oxygenated Mktg. & Trading A.G., 215 F.3d 219, 224 (2d Cir. 2000).
114. Glencore, Ltd. v. Degussa Engineered Carbons L.P., 848 F. Supp. 2d 410, 430 (S.D.N.Y
2012) (quoting Aceros Prefabricados, S.A. v. Tradearbed, Inc., 282 F.3d 92, 100 (2d Cir. 2002)).
115. See id. at 430.
116. 654 F. Supp. 2d 638 (E.D. Mich. 2009).
117. Id. at 648.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Carr v. Michael Weinig, AG, No. 5:01-CV-1514(HGM/GJD), 2006 WL 2355867, at *5
(N.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2006) (quoting Bayway Ref. Co. v. Oxygenated Mktg. & Trading A.G., 215
F.3d 219, 226 (2d Cir. 2000); accord Oceanconnect.com, Inc. v. Chemoil Corp., No. H-07-1053,
2008 WL 194360, at *5 (S.D. Tex., Jan. 23, 2008).
121. Borden Chem., Inc. v. Jahn Foundry Corp., 834 N.E.2d 1227, 1232 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005).
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b. Independent Basis for Establishing Materiality?
A question arising from the surprise or hardship language of comment four to
section 2-207 is whether hardship is a basis independent of surprise for
demonstrating that an additional term constitutes a material alteration. In
comment four of section 2-207, the drafters state that a term is a material
alteration when it results in surprise or hardship, if incorporated without express
awareness by the other party.122 In comment five, however, the drafters list
several clauses, which will not be considered material alterations because they
involve no element of unreasonable surprise.123 Comment five does not address
hardship.124 This apparent inconsistency between the two comments, coupled
with the drafters’ decision not to define surprise or hardship, has resulted in
differing judicial interpretations of the relationship between hardship, surprise,
and material alteration. In this regard, Professor Murray stated:
While “hardship” has often been viewed as substantial economic
hardship and treated as independent from “surprise,” there is a
growing recognition that such an analysis may be flawed. Simply
because a contract requires performance that may be characterized as
a hardship, it may still be an operative term of the contract if it is an
“expected” term, i.e., it is not objectively surprising. “Hardship is a
consequence [of material alteration], not a criterion.”125
Similarly, in Union Carbide Corp. v Oscar Mayer Foods Corp.,126 Judge
Posner explained that the traditional phrasing of the test—whether the term
results in surprise or hardship127—is based on a misreading of comment four to
U.C.C. section 2-207.128 Quoting from the text of comment four, he observed
that the comment seeks to provide examples of “clauses which would normally
materially alter the contract and so result in surprise or hardship if incorporated
without express awareness by the other party.”129 Judge Posner asserted that
“hardship is a consequence, not a criterion” while surprise may be either.130 This
perspective finds support in the general principle that a party may not be
exempted from an agreement to perform contractual duties simply because
performance of those duties has become a hardship.131
As alluded to above, jurisdictions differ in their approaches to the issue of
whether hardship provides an independent ground on which a non-assenting

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

U.C.C. § 2-207, cmt. 4 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
Id. at cmt. 5.
See id.
Murray, supra note 92, at 9–10.
947 F.2d 1333 (7th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 1336.
Id.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id.
Id.
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party can demonstrate materiality.132 In the cases surveyed, many courts simply
refrained from addressing this issue and, after articulating the surprise or
hardship test, made the materiality determination by examining surprise alone133
or in conjunction with hardship.134
A split exists, however, among the jurisdictions that specifically considered
the role of hardship in applying the test. Some courts have adopted the Seventh
Circuit approach in holding that hardship is merely a consequence of surprise
and not a separate basis for examining the materiality of an additional term.135
Other courts have declined the invitation of the Seventh Circuit and some
commentators; these courts held that hardship is an independent test of
materiality. For example in Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co. v. PPG Industries,
Inc.,136 the court found “that enforcement of the damages limitation provision
would result in both hardship and surprise [to the non-assenting party].”137
Explaining its decision not to adopt the reasoning of Union Carbide, the court
stated that while an interpretation of comments four and five excluding hardship
may seem reasonable, it fails to provide an answer as to why the drafters
included hardship at all.138 Further, the Eighth Circuit noted that the comments
do not carry the force of law.139
In several cases, courts expressed sympathy for the notion that hardship is
merely a consequence of surprise, but nevertheless determined materiality by
considering surprise and, alternatively, hardship.140 Finally, a notable number
of courts addressed only surprise without discussing hardship.141 In such

132. See infra text accompanying notes 133–41.
133. See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Biodiesel of Las Vegas, Inc., No. 2:09-cv-02134-JCM-RJI, 2010
WL 4121850, at *4–5 (D. Nev. Sept. 8, 2010) (articulating a surprise or hardship test, but focusing
on the surprise element in finding no material alteration).
134. See, e.g., Dumont Tel. Co. v. Power & Tel. Supply Co., 962 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1079–80
(N.D. Iowa 2013).
135. See, e.g., Paul Gottlieb & Co. v. Alps South Corp., 985 So. 2d 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
136. 401 F.3d 901 (8th Cir. 2005).
137. Id. at 912.
138. Id. at 911 n.6.
139. Id.
140. See, e.g., Rocheux Int’l of N. J., Inc. v. U.S. Merchants Fin. Grp., Inc., 741 F. Supp. 2d
651, 684 (D.N.J. 2010) (acknowledging the sound reasoning of cases questioning whether hardship
is an independent factor while focusing on whether an interest clause would impose substantial
economic hardship on the non-assenting party); Oceanconnect.com, Inc. v Chemoil Corp., No. H07-1053, 2008 WL 194360, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 23, 2008); Carr v. Michael Weinig, AG, No. 5:01CV-1514(HGM/GJD), 2006 WL 2355867, at *5 (N.D.N.Y., Aug. 14, 2006) (noting that the Second
Circuit has expressed doubt as to whether hardship is an independent basis for finding a material
alteration, but explicitly declined to resolve the issue).
141. In cases assessing the materiality of interest and arbitration clauses, courts typically only
addressed the surprise element of the test and were silent on hardship. See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v.
Biodiesel of Las Vegas, Inc., No. 2:09-cv-02134-JCM-RJJ, 2010 WL 4121850, at *5 (D. Nev. Sept.
8, 2010) (articulating the surprise or hardship test, but focusing on the surprise element in finding
no material alteration).
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instances, the Seventh Circuit’s admonition against considering hardship as a
criterion may have been indirectly achieved.
B. Factors that Affect the Meaning of “Surprise” or “Hardship”
1. Course of Dealing
a. The Significance of Course of Dealing
The presence of a course of dealing and, to a lesser extent, a trade usage, are
among the more important factual circumstances that influence whether
inclusion of an additional term materially alters an agreement.142 Commenting
on the role that trade usage and course of dealing play in determining whether
an additional term materially alters the agreement, one commentator stated the
issue is “the offeror’s reasonable intention manifested by the preprinted form in
the context of the particularities of the transaction and such circumstances as
course of dealing or trade usage.”143 The cases reviewed proved that the
commentator was prescient.
The U.C.C. defines usage of trade as “any practice or method of dealing
having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation, or trade as to justify
an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in
question.”144 Section 1-303(d) states that trade usage is relevant only when the
parties are or should be aware of the industry custom in question.145 This is
consistent with the requirement in Subsection (c) that the usage of trade must
have “regularity of observance.”146
Course of dealing is “a sequence of conduct concerning previous transactions
between the parties to a particular transaction that is fairly to be regarded as
establishing a common basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions
and other conduct.”147 Comment two of U.C.C. section 1-303 further explains
that course of dealing is restricted to “a sequence of conduct between the parties
previous to the agreement.”148 Courts have found that in order to establish a
course of dealing, there must have been more than one prior transaction between
the parties.149
The foregoing definitions have understandably prompted more than one
commentator to persuasively argue that a term implied into an agreement by
virtue of trade usage and prior course of dealing should not be subjected to a
142. See discussion accompanying infra notes 143–151.
143. Brown, supra note 53, at 934–35.
144. U.C.C. § 1-303(c) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2001).
145. U.C.C. § 1-303(d) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2001).
146. U.C.C. § 1-303(c) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2001).
147. U.C.C. § 1-303(b) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2001).
148. U.C.C. § 1-303 cmt. 2 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2001).
149. See Pycsa Panama, S.A. v. Tensar Earth Techs., Inc., 625 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1251 (S.D.
Fla. 2008), aff’d, 329 F. App’x 257 (11th Cir. 2009).

508

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 65:489

section 2-207(2)(b) additional term analysis.150 According to one, “[a] term that
simply makes explicit what would otherwise be imported into the contract
through a course of dealing or usage in the trade is not a material alteration; in
fact, it is no alteration at all.”151 Notwithstanding the merit of this perspective,
in the cases reviewed, courts did not discuss this issue, but instead considered
the absence or presence of trade usage and/or a course of dealing in assessing
whether there was unreasonable surprise or hardship under section 2-207(2)(b).
b. What Constitutes a Course of Dealing?
A party arguing for including an additional term within an agreement will
often argue that the party’s repeated sending to the non-assenting party forms
(e.g., a seller’s invoice) in previous transactions establishes a course of dealing
that will negate unreasonable surprise, and consequently, materiality. The cases
reviewed revealed that many courts assume, without discussion, that an offeree’s
repetitive sending of a form can give rise to a course of dealing that can
overcome the non-assenting party’s materiality argument.152 These courts adopt
this approach even in cases where there was no evidence that the recipient had
read any of the forms containing the additional term.153
Among the courts that have addressed whether a course of dealing arises from
a party’s repetitive sending of forms containing the disputed term, there is a
notable split. Although some courts found that no course of dealing arose,154
more courts found that a course of dealing arose from the repetitive sending of
forms containing the additional terms.155
150. See, e.g., John E. Murray, The Judicial Vision of Contract—The “Constructed Circle of
Assent and Printed Terms, 26 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 386, 403 (2014) (stating that terms implied by
virtue of prior course of dealing and trade usage are not subject to section 2-207(2)).
151. Brown, supra note 53, at 935; see also Murray, supra note 150, at 403.
152. See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Biodiesel of Las Vegas, Inc., No. 2:09-CV-02134-JCM, 2010
WL 4121850, at *5 (D. Nev. Sept. 8, 2010); Pycsa Panama, S.A., 625 F. Supp. 2d at 1251.
153. See Ranere, supra note 85, at 689 (recognizing one approach by a court where the
recipient reading the form was irrelevant in determining whether a prior course of dealing existed,
but the number of times the invoice or acknowledgment had been sent was relevant).
154. Welsh v. TEX-MACH, Inc., NO. 08-CV-11401-DPW, 2009 WL 2922955, at *10 (D.
Mass. Aug. 28, 2009) (holding that the repeated sending of an invoice containing an
indemnification clause did not constitute a course of dealing); C9 Ventures v. SVC-W., L.P., 202
Cal. App. 4th 1483, 1488 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012).
155. Hagrpota for Trading & Distrib., Ltd. v. Oakley Fertilizer, Inc., No. 09 Civ.
9779(CM)(KNF), 2010 WL 2594286, at *7–8 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2010), aff’d, 531 F. App’x 131
(2d Cir. 2013) (finding that confirmations containing arbitration provisions from at least twentytwo previous transactions between the parties created a course of dealing sufficient enough to
overcome unreasonable surprise argument); Bell, Inc. v. IFS Indus., Inc., 742 F. Supp. 2d 1049,
1053 (D.S.D. 2010) (holding that the repeated sending of a form containing a forum selection clause
without objection by the buyer established a course of dealing); Cargill, 2010 WL 4121850, at *5
(describing sales agreements containing an arbitration provision in dozens of previous transactions
between the parties, which supported the inclusion of the provision in the contract); CFMOTO
Powersports Inc. v. NNR Global Logistics USA, Inc., No. 09-2202 (JRT/JJK), 2009 WL 4730330,
at *5 (D. Minn. 2009) (detailing how terms and conditions attached to 224 invoices established
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Courts that either failed to address the issue or concluded that the repetitive
sending of forms created a course of dealing arguably resurrected elements of
the last shot rule that section 2-207 sought to displace. According to Professor
Murray, “‘Course of dealing’ requires a previous sequence of conduct between
the parties. The passive conduct of sending and receiving the same boilerplate
should not be said to establish a course of dealing.”156 Another commentator
has written:
To recognize a course of dealing as a mere tally of exchanges between
two contracting parties would undermine the central purpose of
section 2-207 because it would perpetuate the problem of giving one
of the parties the “last shot.” . . . Enforcing all terms—regardless of
materiality—simply because the accepting party received them in a
series of prior exchanges . . . . This would violate the essential purpose
of section 2-207 and arguably restore the “last-shot” nature of
common law contract interpretation that the Code authors sought to
eliminate. Accordingly, courts should determine the existence of a
course of dealing on a term-by-term basis: only when there is evidence
that the parties have acted by words or actions to acknowledge a
specific term should a court allow their prior dealings to impact the
term’s enforcement.157
Review of judicial decisions addressing course of dealing in the context of
section 2-207(2)(b) reveals that courts have by and large ignored these
concerns.158
2. Case-by-Case Versus Per Se Approach
Over the last decade, courts tended to state that determinations of material
alteration were to be made on a case-by-case basis.159 Adopting this fact-based
approach, they then examined the factual circumstances, such as the presence of
a course of dealing, to determine whether surprise was present.160 The review
of cases revealed, however, that courts departed from a case-by-case approach
and engaged in something akin to a per se analysis in determining the materiality
of forum selection161 and pre-judgment interest clauses.162 On the other hand,
course of dealing); Pycsa Panama, S.A., 625 F. Supp. 2d at 1251 (holding that by sending invoices
on fourteen occasions, which were attached with terms and conditions that included a limited
remedy provision, the seller defeated the buyer’s surprise argument); R.O.W. Window Co. v.
Allmetal, Inc., 856 N.E.2d 55, 60 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (holding that the seller’s repeated sending of
invoices containing a conspicuous disclaimer of warranties established a prior course of dealing).
156. Murray, supra note 92, at 10–11.
157. Ranere, supra note 85, at 690.
158. See id. at 687–88 (noting the conflict among the jurisdictions and the resulting
uncertainty).
159. See infra discussion accompanying notes 239–41.
160. See infra discussion accompanying notes 178, 209–19.
161. See infra discussion accompanying notes 376–79.
162. See infra discussion accompanying notes 324–29.
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in a departure from the past in which some courts commonly held that a
disclaimer of warranties,163 indemnification164 and arbitration provisions per se
materially altered the party’s contracts, courts analyzing these additional terms
opted for a fact specific approach.165
3. The Irrelevance of the Negation of Implied Terms
The final observation that can be drawn from the cases reviewed relates to
whether an additional term materially alters the contract. An additional term
negating a U.C.C. implied term alone was not a sufficient basis for finding that
the additional term materially altered the parties’ agreement. As expressed by
one commentator, “The issue is whether the deal proposed by the offeror is
materially altered by the new term, not whether a standard deal envisioned by
the Code drafters is so altered.”166 The courts appear to have followed that view
in finding that an additional term negating a gap-filler term (e.g., a disclaimer of
an implied warranty) is not, by itself, a material alteration.167
III. ANALYSIS OF SPECIFIC CLAUSES
The Article will now discuss the judicial treatment of six clauses that often
appear as additional terms in acceptance and confirmation documents. These
include: (1) arbitration; (2) warranty disclaimer; (3) limitation of remedy; (4)
pre-judgment interest; (5) attorney’s fees, and (6) forum selection. The
discussion begins with arbitration clauses.

163. Brown, supra note 53, at 936 (observing that courts commonly find a warranty disclaimer
to materially alter the contract without taking into account all of the factual circumstances,
including trade usage and prior course of dealing); Alex Devience, Jr., The Renewed Search for the
“Bargain in Fact” Under U.C.C. 2-207: Battle of the Forms, Part II? Comments on the
Recommendation to Revise Section 2-207, 9 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 349, 371–72 (1997) (suggesting
that courts at that time invariably found that an additional term disclaiming implied warranties
materially altered the agreement); Murray, supra note 92, at 11 (observing courts’ tendency to find
that a warranty disclaimer clause constituted a material alteration).
164. Murray, supra note 92, at 11 (observing that courts commonly held that an
indemnification clause constituted an additional term that materially altered the contract).
165. See infra text accompanying notes 178, 209–19.
166. Brown, supra note 53, at 937. Professor Brown added that:
[O]nly in the presence of evidence tending to show that the offeree’s term is extremely
unusual in the industry or between the parties should a gap-filler weigh heavily in
determining whether the term constitutes a material alteration. This is so even if the evidence
of the term’s observance falls far short of the standard of regularity necessary to show a
usage or course of dealing.
Id. at 936.
167. Id.
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A. Arbitration Provisions: Summary of Findings
In sixteen reviewed cases, courts addressed whether an arbitration provision
constituted a material alteration.168 In four cases, courts ruled that section 2207(2)(b) was inapplicable either because, pursuant to sections 2-207(a) or (c),
the non-assenting party had objected to the arbitration provisions inclusion in
the agreements,169 or because the arbitration provision was a term of the offer
and, as such, should be included in the parties’ contract.170 Of the remaining
twelve cases, only one court concluded that arbitration provisions materially
altered the agreement.171
Courts, finding that an arbitration clause did not materially alter, rejected a
per se standard in favor of a case-by-case approach.172 These courts also adopted
a surprise or hardship test to gauge materiality.173 Courts overwhelmingly ruled
or assumed, without discussion, that surprise and hardship are independent tests
and that the presence of either renders an additional term a material alteration.174
The presence of either a trade usage establishing that arbitration was a
common industry practice or a course of dealing based on an arbitration
provision that appeared in forms previously communicated between the parties
was particularly instrumental to courts deciding that an arbitration provision did
not materially alter a contract. Five cases focused on trade usage175 and five on

168. See, e.g., Glencore Ltd. V. Degussa Engineered Carbons, L.P., 848 F. Supp. 2d 410, 429
(S.D.N.Y. 2012).
169. Stemcor USA, Inc. v. Trident Steel Corp., 471 F. Supp. 2d 362, 369–70 (S.D.N.Y. 2006);
see Gen. Steel Corp. v. Collins, 196 S.W.3d 18, 21–22 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006) (detailing how the
deleted arbitration provision in the contract did not become a part of the agreement).
170. Newark Bay Cogeneration P’ship, LP v. ETS Power Grp., No. CIV.A 11-2441
(ES)(CLW), 2012 WL 4504475, at *11–12 (D.N.J. Sept. 28, 2012) (holding the materiality analysis
in section 2-207(2)(b) is inapplicable when the disputed term is contained in the offer rather than
an acceptance or confirmation); Vicor Corp. v. Concurrent Computer Corp., No. 051437A, 2006
WL 1047522, at *5 (Mass. Super. Ct., Mar. 6, 2006).
171. Hitchiner Mfg. Co., v. Modern Indus., Inc., No. 09-cv-242-PB, 2009 WL 3643471, at *4
(D.N.H. Oct. 29, 2009) (establishing that an arbitration clause included in an order confirmation
materially alters the contract because the order confirmation is deemed an acceptance).
172. See, e.g., Glencore, 848 F. Supp. 2d at 429.
173. See, e.g., id.
174. See, e.g., Welsh v. TEX-MACH, Inc., No. 08-cv-11401-DPW, 2009 WL 2922955, at *7–
9 (D. Mass. Aug. 28, 2009); Cheboygan Cement Prods., Inc. v. Glawe, Inc., No. 309745, 2014 WL
2351772, at *10 (Mich. Ct. App. May 29, 2014).
175. In the following cases, courts relied on the existence of industry custom of arbitration in
rejecting a party’s assertion that including an arbitration provision in the agreement would result in
surprise or hardship and thus materially alter the agreement: Shany Co., Ltd. v. Crain Walnut
Shelling, Inc., No. S-11-1112 KJM EFB, 2012 WL 1979244, at *7 (E.D. Cal., June 1, 2012); ICC
Chem. Corp. v. Vitol, Inc., 425 F. App’x. 57, 59–60 (2d Cir. 2011); Glencore, 848 F. Supp. 2d at
430; Newark Bay, 2012 WL 4504475, at *12 (adopting the approach adhered to in the foregoing
cases that there is no surprise where arbitration is an established practice in the parties’ industry);
Colo.-Ark.-Tex. Distrib., L.L.C. v. Am. Eagle Food Prods., Inc., 525 F. Supp. 2d 428, 434–35
(S.D.N.Y. 2007). The court in Am. Eagle also relied on a prior course of dealing, specifically
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a course of dealing, which involved the repetitive sending by the offeree of a
form containing an arbitration clause.176 Other grounds for finding an arbitration
provision did not materially alter were the failure of the non-assenting party to
allege surprise or hardship177 and the express assent to the additional term by the
party challenging the inclusion of the arbitration clause.178
1. Section 2-207(2)(b) Inapplicable
In Stemcor USA, Inc. v. Trident Steel Corp.,179 the court found that section 2207(2)(a) rather than section 2-207(2)(b) governed whether to include an
additional term in the contract.180 The buyer initiated contract formation by
sending a purchase order to the seller.181 The seller responded with an
acknowledgment form and a sales invoice.182 Each of the seller’s forms included
an arbitration clause to govern disputes.183 The court ruled that the parties’
exchange of forms gave rise to a contract under section 2-207(1), given the
absence of unambiguous conditional acceptance language in the seller’s
forms.184 The court then addressed whether the arbitration provision in the
seller’s acceptance forms was a part of the contract.185 The court found that even
assuming that the arbitration provision was not material, the clause nevertheless
must be excluded from the contract because the buyer’s purchase order expressly
provided that no terms outside of the purchase order would bind the buyer.186

arbitration clauses appearing in documents in previous transactions between the parties to negate
the non-assenting party’s surprise or hardship argument. Id.
176. Dumont Tel. Co. v. Power & Tel. Supply Co., 962 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1079 (N.D. Iowa
2013); Hagrpota for Trading & Distrib., Ltd. v. Oakley Fertilizer Inc., No. 09 Civ.
9770(CM)(KNF), 2010 WL 2594286, at *7–8 (S.D.N.Y., June. 18, 2010), aff’d, 531 F. App’x 131
(2d Cir. 2013); Cargill, Inc. v. Biodiesel of Las Vegas, Inc., No. 2:09–cv–02134–JCM–RJJ,
2010 WL 4121850, at *5 (D. Nev. Sept. 8, 2010) (establishing that because arbitration provisions
were included in sales agreements used in dozens of previous transactions between the parties, its
inclusion in the contract was supported); Oceanconnect.com, Inc. v. Chemoil Corp., No. H-071053, 2008 WL 194360, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 23, 2008); Am. Eagle, 525 F. Supp. 2d at 434–35
(employing the usage of arbitration in the nut industry to negate the non-assenting party’s surprise
or hardship argument).
177. Astra Oil Co., LLC v. Hydro Syntec Chem., Inc., No. 1:13-cv-08395(ALC), 2014 WL
630676, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2014); Beck Aluminum Int’l, LLC v. Aluar Aluminio Argentino,
S.A.I.C., No. 1:09 CV 2978, 2010 WL 3260017, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 18, 2010).
178. Newark Bay, 2012 WL 4504475, at *11–13.
179. 471 F. Supp. 2d 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
180. Id. At 369–70.
181. Id. At 364.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. At 367.
185. Id. At 369–70.
186. Id.
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This language satisfied section 2-207(2)(a) and therefore excluded the seller’s
additional terms from the contract.187
Section 2-207(2)(b) was inapplicable in Vicor Corp. v. Concurrent Computer
Corp.188 because the arbitration provision appeared in the buyer’s purchase
order, which constituted an offer (the buyer, who also sold products, sent the
seller the form that the buyer typically used when it was in the position of a
seller).189 The seller’s acknowledgement form was silent as to arbitration, so it
accepted the buyer’s offer, including the arbitration provision.190 Other courts
have made the same holding.191
2. Arbitration Clause Does not Materially Alter
The presence of trade usage and prior course of dealing figured prominently
in the nine decisions in which courts concluded that an arbitration provision did
not materially alter the parties’ contract.192 Glencore Ltd. v. Degussa
Engineered Carbon, L.P.,193 in which a federal district court applied New York
law, is illustrative of these cases. In Glencore, the buyer sued the seller arguing
that oil the seller had delivered failed to conform to the contract specifications.194
The seller demanded that the dispute be submitted to arbitration pursuant to an
arbitration clause contained in the general terms and conditions that had been
incorporated, by reference, into a sales contract the seller had emailed to the
buyer.195 The court found that the buyer had assented to the terms of the sales
contract, including the arbitration provision.196 Alternatively, the court
concluded that absent express assent, the arbitration clause should be included
into the parties’ contract because it was an additional term that did not materially
alter the contract.197 In so concluding, the court relied on Aceros Prefabricados,
S.A. v. Tradearbed, Inc.,198 a Second Circuit case applying New York law, and
held that a mandatory arbitration provision is neither per se material nor
immaterial and any such determination must be made on a case-by-case basis.199
187. Id.
188. No. 051437A, 2006 WL 1047522 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 6, 2006), aff’d, 861 N.E.2d 810
(Mass. App. Ct. 2007).
189. Id. At *4–5.
190. Id. At *5.
191. See, e.g., Newark Bay Cogeneration P’ship, LP v. ETS Power Group, No. 112441(ES)(CLW), 2012 WL 4504475, at *11 (D.N.J. Sept. 28, 2012) (arbitration provision was in
the offer).
192. See, e.g., Glencore Ltd. v. Degussa Engineered Carbons, L.P., 848 F. Supp. 2d 410, 429–
31 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
193. 848 F. Supp. 2d 410 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
194. Id. At 413.
195. Id. At 414–15.
196. Id. At 429.
197. Id. At 429–30.
198. 282 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2002).
199. Glencore, 848 F. Supp. 2d at 429.
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Thus, the court rejected conclusively finding arbitration provisions to materially
alter unless a party expressly and separately assented to the provision, which had
been characterized as the “New York Rule.”200 Quoting Aceros, the court stated
that a material alteration is “one that would result in surprise or hardship if
incorporated without express awareness by the other party.”201 It further held
that surprise includes:
[B]oth a subjective element of what a party actually knew and an
objective element of what a party should have known; thus, a
profession of surprise is insufficient to establish surprise unless the
non-assenting party can also establish that, under the circumstances it
cannot be presumed that a reasonable merchant would have consented
to the additional term.202
The court buttressed its conclusion that the buyer had failed to establish the
surprise by finding a trade usage in the petroleum industry where arbitration
provisions are often invoked.203
The Glencore court’s approach was generally adopted in four cases applying
California, New York, and Texas law, in which a trade usage favoring arbitration
was either determinative or an important factor in the courts’ decisions that an
arbitration provision did not materially alter the contract.204 In these cases,
courts concluded that absent subjective/actual knowledge by the non-assenting
party of the presence of an arbitration provision in the other party’s form, the
presence of trade usage satisfied the objective component of surprise, so as to
prevent a finding of a material alteration.205 Applying Texas law, a federal court
noted that “[t]he U.C.C. does not require that a party to a contract have actual
knowledge of a usage of trade before that usage of trade is incorporated into the
contract.”206
Four courts used a prior course of dealing to reject a non-assenting party’s
claim that an arbitration provision materially altered the parties’ contract.207 In
200. Id. At 430 n.17.
201. Id. At 429 (quoting Aceros Prefabricados, S.A. v. Tradearbed, Inc., 282 F.3d 92, 100 (2d
Cir. 2002).
202. Id. At 429–30 (internal quotation marks omitted).
203. Id. At 431.
204. Shaney Co., Ltd. v. Crain Walnut Shelling, Inc., No. S-11-1112(KJM)(EFB), 2012 WL
1979244, at *7 (E.D. Cal. June 1, 2012); ICC Chem. Corp. v. Vitol, Inc., 425 F. App’x 57, 59–60
(2d Cir. 2011); Oceanconnect.com, Inc. v. Chemoil Corp., No. H-07-1053, 2008 WL 194360, at *4
(S.D. Tex. Jan. 23, 2008); Colo.-Ark.-Tex. Distrib., L.L.C. v. Am. Eagle Food Prods., Inc., 525 F.
Supp. 2d 428, 434-35 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (relying in part on the presence of trade usage of arbitration
in the nut industry to negate the non-assenting party’s surprise or hardship argument).
205. See ICC Chem., 425 F. App’x at 59-60; Shaney, 2012 WL 1979244, at *6–7;
Oceanconnect, 2008 WL 194360, at *4; Am. Eagle, 525 F. Supp. 2d at 434–35.
206. Oceanconnect, 2008 WL 194360, at *4.
207. Dumont Tel. Co. v. Power & Tel. Supply Co., 962 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1079–80 (N.D. Iowa
2013); Hagrpota for Trading & Distrib., Ltd. v. Oakley Fertilizer Inc., No. 9779(CM)(KNF), 2010
WL 2594286, at *7–8 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2010), aff’d, 431 F. App’x 131, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS
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these decisions, the courts allowed a course of dealing to be created by the
repeated presence of an arbitration clause in the offeree’s acceptance of a seller’s
confirmation.208 In Dumont Telephone Co. v. Power & Telephone Supply Co.,209
a buyer argued that an arbitration clause in a seller’s invoices should not be a
term of the contract because they had failed to read the back of the invoices on
which the clause appeared.210 The court rejected the buyer’s argument because
the seller had sent 510 invoices in previous transactions, thereby establishing a
course of dealing.211 The court expressed doubt that the buyer would not have
been subjectively aware of the arbitration provision given the number of times
it appeared in the seller’s invoices.212 Assuming a lack of actual knowledge, the
court further stated that given the prior course of between the parties, “it is not
objectively reasonable for Dumont, a merchant corporation, to be unaware of a
contract provision it has received 510 times before in its prior dealings with
Power & Tel.”213
In OceanConnect.Com, Inc. v. Chemoil Corp.,214 the arbitration provisions in
seven previous sales contracts between the parties were sufficient to rebut the
non-assenting party’s claim of surprise.215 Similarly, in Hagrpota for Trading
& Distribution, Ltd. v. Oakley Fertilizer Inc.,216 arbitration clauses in documents
incorporated by reference into confirmations on at least twenty-one previous
transactions between the parties was sufficient to establish a course of dealing
of arbitration and to support the court’s decision to include the provision in the
contract.217
Courts tended to focus on the surprise strand of the surprise or hardship
standard in concluding that an arbitration provision did not materially alter and
therefore should be included in the contract. Courts referred to hardship in only
two cases. In Dumont, the court rejected the buyer’s argument that, if included,
the arbitration provision’s deprivation of its right to a judicial forum constituted
a hardship resulting in a material alteration.218 The court explained “the mere
fact that an arbitration provision deprives a party of a judicial forum cannot

17828 (2d Cir. 2013); Oceanconnect, 2008 WL 194360, at *5; Am. Eagle, 525 F. Supp. 2d at 434–
35 (finding the presence of trade usage).
208. See Dumont, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 1079–80.
209. 962 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (N.D. Iowa 2013).
210. Id. at 1078.
211. Id. at 1079.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. No. H-07-105, 2008 WL 194360 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 23, 2008).
215. Id. at *5.
216. No. 9779(CM)(KNF), 2010 WL 2594286 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2010).
217. Id. at *7–8; see also Colo.-Ark.-Tex. Distrib., L.L.C., 525 F. Supp. 2d at 434–35 (finding
that the presence of arbitration provisions in the seller’s confirmations in several previous
transactions created a course of dealing and undermined the buyer’s surprise argument).
218. Dumont, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 1080.
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constitute ‘hardship’ for the purpose of materially altering a contract.”219 In
Oceanconnect.com, the court examined the question of whether hardship
constitutes a separate basis for establishing a material alteration or if it’s simply
a consequence of a material alteration.220 Without deciding on this issue, the
court adopted the approach taken by courts that have relied on hardship to
determine a material alteration. The court found a hardship arises when a “term
is one that creates or allocates an open-ended and prolonged liability.”221
3. Arbitration Clause Materially Alters
In two of the cases, the courts held that an arbitration provision materially
altered the contract.222 In one decision, the court applied a per se approach;223
in the other, the court applied a case-by-case approach.224 In Hitchiner
Manufacturing Co. v. Modern Industries, Inc.,225 a seller’s price quote and
acknowledgment sent in response to a buyer’s purchase order included an
arbitration clause.226 Because the court found that the price quote was not an
offer, the court initially rejected the seller’s argument that the presence of the
arbitration provision in its price quote made it a part of the agreement.227 It then
turned to section 2-207(2)(b) to determine if the additional term—the arbitration
provision in the seller’s acknowledgement, which the court deemed an
acceptance of the buyer’s purchase order/offer—was a part of the agreement.228
In excluding the arbitration provision from the agreement, the Hitchiner court
relied on a 1990 case that applied what was then considered the majority rule
that arbitration provisions materially alter the contract.229 Importantly, the court
neglected to inquire into whether inclusion of the provision would result in
surprise or hardship to the buyer.230
Applying a facts-based approach, the court in Cogent Computer Systems, Inc.
v. Turbochef Technologies, Inc.,231 ruled that the inclusion of additional terms,
including an arbitration provision, materially altered the contract between
parties. Finding that additional terms would result in surprise or hardship if

219. Id.
220. Oceanconnect, 2008 WL 194360, at *5.
221. Id.
222. Hitchner Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Modern Indus., Inc., No. 09-cv-242-PB, 2009 WL 3643471, at
*4 (D.N.H. Oct. 29, 2009); Cogent Comput. Sys., Inc. v. Turbochef Tech., Inc., No. 06-280S, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5302, at *12 (D.R.I. Jan. 24, 2008).
223. Cogent, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5302, at *12.
224. Hitchiner, 2009 WL 3643471, at *4.
225. No. 09-cv-242-PB, 2009 WL 3643471 (D.N.H., Oct. 29, 2009).
226. Id. at *1.
227. Id. at *3.
228. Id. at *4.
229. Id. at *4.
230. See id.
231. No. 06-280S, 2008 WL 219343 (D.R.I. Jan. 24, 2008).
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incorporated without Cogent’s express consent,232 the court relied, in part, on
precedent, which held that an arbitration provision is a per se material
alteration.233 It further explained, however, that there was no evidence to
suggest that the seller would have had reason to think that it would be subject to
arbitration.234 This undue surprise warranted excluding the clause from the
agreement.235 The court distinguished Cogent from those cases where
arbitration could be established on the basis of a course of dealing.236 It also
noted that the arbitration provision was not conspicuous.237 Finally, it found that
because the additional terms required the arbitration to take place in Atlanta,
Georgia, the seller would suffer an undue hardship.238
The cases reviewed represent a shift in courts’ treatment of arbitration
provisions. Historically, there was considerable uncertainty surrounding
whether arbitration provisions materially alter the parties’ contract.239 The shift
may be a consequence of the increased use of arbitration to resolve commercial
disputes,240 which makes it easier for arbitration to be a trade usage, leading to
the demise of the New York rule under which arbitration clauses were deemed
per se material alterations.241 The above cases suggest the shift is a consequence
of courts’ greater application of a case-by-case approach in determining when
clauses materially alter agreements.
B. Disclaimer-of-Warranty Clause
The terms and conditions often incorporated into or attached to a seller’s
acknowledgment, invoice, sales contract, or confirmation will likely provide for
some kind of express warranty, while disclaiming implied warranties. If a
disclaimer of implied warranties complies with section 2-316(2) or (3), it will
be effective.242 The following is a sample disclaimer that might appear in a
seller’s documents:
Disclaimer. EXCEPT AS EXPRESSLY SET FORTH IN THE
SPECIFIC WARRANTY FOR A PRODUCT, SELLER MAKES NO
232. Id. at *12.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at *12–13.
237. Id. at *13.
238. Id. at *12.
239. See Stephens, supra note 2, at 246 (noting the uncertainty regarding whether arbitration
clauses were considered material alterations).
240. See MARTIN DOMKE, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION §6.1 (3D ED. 2015)
(commenting that the use of arbitration to resolve various types of commercial disputes has
increased dramatically, expanding from an estimated 6,448 filings in 1981 to 187,596 filings in
2011).
241. See Glencore Ltd. v. Degussa Engineered Carbons L.P., 848 F. Supp. 2d 410, 430 n.17
(S.D.N.Y. 2010).
242. U.C.C. § 2-316(2)–(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
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REPRESENTATIONS OR WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR
IMPLIED, WRITTEN OR ORAL, RELATING TO THE
PRODUCTS, OR THE PERFORMANCE OF ITS OBLIGATIONS
UNDER THE TRANSACTION DOCUMENTS, AND SELLER
HEREBY DISCLAIMS ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OR
MERCHANTABILITY IMPOSED BY LAW (INCLUDING,
WITHOUT LIMITATION, WARRANTIES OF DESCRIPTION,
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS . . . TO THE EXTENT
PERMISSIBLE.243
Seven cases were decided over the past decade in which courts addressed
whether a disclaimer-of-warranty clause, appearing in a seller’s document as an
additional term, constituted a material alteration.244 In four of these cases, the
courts ruled that the disclaimer was not a material alteration and, therefore,
became a term of the contract.245 The opposite result was reached in the three
other cases.246
Courts finding that a warranty disclaimer clause was not a material alteration
tended to adopt a case-by-case approach and the surprise or hardship test for
determining whether a warranty disclaimer clause amounted to a material
alteration.247 In contrast, courts finding that a warranty disclaimer materially
altered the contract did not engage in analysis that was as fact intensive.248 As
noted previously249 and as was true of arbitration clauses, the case results
represent a departure from previous decades when courts, relying on the
language of comment four, gravitated toward finding that disclaimer of warranty
clauses constituted material alterations.250 Over the last decade, courts astutely
avoided placing too much reliance on comment four’s examples of terms that

243. Leica Geosystems, Inc. v. L.W.S. Leasing, Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1200 n.8 (D. Colo.
2012). A limited remedy provision and a disclaimer of consequential damages, both of which are
discussed infra, will often appear in tandem with a seller’s warranty disclaimer.
244. See infra notes 245–46.
245. BVS, Inc. v. CDW Direct, LLC, 936 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1027 (N.D. Iowa 2013), rev’d,
759 F.3d 869 (8th Cir. 2014); NIC Holding Corp. v. Lukoil Pan Americas LLC, No. 05 CIV 9372,
2008 WL 4212462, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2008); Monarch Nutritional Labs., Inc. v. Maximum
Human Performance, Inc., No. 2:03CV474TC, 2005 WL 1683734, at *10 (D. Utah Jul. 18, 2005);
R.O.W. Window Co. v. Allmetal, Inc., 856 N.E.2d 55, 61 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006).
246. Leica, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 1200; Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Roadtec, Inc., No. 09 Civ.
06747(PGG), 2010 WL 4967979, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2010); Distinctive Cabinetry, Inc. v.
Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 08-10233, 2009 WL 1448954, at *8 (E.D. Mich. May 22, 2009).
247. See infra notes 252–63.
248. See infra notes 264–73.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 87–92.
250. Brown, supra note 53, at 936 (stating that warranty disclaimer clauses were commonly
found to be material alterations); Murray, supra note 92, at 11 (stating that in 2000, courts at the
time conclusively presumed that warranty disclaimers constituted materially alterations); see
Ranere, supra note 85, at 680 (identifying warranty disclaimer as illustrating the type of clauses in
which courts tended to find were per se material alterations).
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materially alter and instead engaged in the fact-based analysis contemplated by
the surprise or hardship test of materiality.251
1. Warranty Disclaimer Clause Does Not Materially Alter
In two cases, the existence of course of dealings between the parties was the
basis for the courts’ decisions that a warranty disclaimer was not a material
alteration.252 In both instances, the course of dealing arose from the seller’s
repeated sending of its terms and conditions without objection by the buyer.253
In Monarch Nutritional Laboratories, Inc. v. Maximum Human Performance,
Inc.,254 in twelve previous transactions, the buyer had received the seller’s terms
and conditions that contained conspicuous warranty disclaimers in the packing
paper or invoices.255 Applying a surprise or hardship test for determining
materiality, the court found that the buyer’s failure to object and to otherwise
offer proof of surprise or hardship resulted in its failure to carry its burden of
establishing that a limitation of damages and disclaimer provision were material
alterations.256 In R.O.W. Window Co. v. Allmetal, Inc.,257 the court ruled the
buyer’s material alteration argument was negated by a course of dealing arising
from the seller’s invoices conspicuously disclaiming warranties, which were
sent over a sixteen-year period.258 A course of dealing was also instrumental in
the Eighth Circuit’s remand of a lower court decision that a disclaimer in the
seller’s terms and conditions was part of a course of dealing that supplemented
the parties’ contract.259 The district court found that the seller established a
course of dealing to defeat the buyer’s materiality argument by proving that
more than 250 of the seller’s confirmation invoices and other documents from
previous transactions included a warranty disclaimer.260 In BVS, Inc. v. CDW
Direct, LLC,261 the Eighth Circuit accepted the notion that a party can overcome
a non-assenting party’s materiality argument by establishing a course of dealing
and remanded the case because the uniqueness of the contract formation process
251. See, e.g., Pycsa Panama, S.A. v. Tensar Earth Techs., Inc., 625 F. Supp. 2d 1198 (S.D.
Fla. 2008), aff’d, 329 F. App’x. 257 (11th Cir. 2009); see also Monarch Nutritional Labs., Inc. v.
Maximum Human Perforance, Inc., No. 2:03CV474TC, 2005 WL 1683734 at *7–9 (D. Utah July.
18, 2005).
252. Monarch Nutritional Labs., 2005 WL 1683734, at *8–10; R.O.W. Window Co. v.
Allmetal, Inc., 856 N.E.2d 55, 60–61 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006).
253. Monarch Nutritional Labs., 2005 WL 1683734, at *8–10; R.O.W. Window, 856 N.E.2d at
60–61.
254. No. 2:03CV474TC, 2005 WL 1683734 (D. Utah July 18, 2005).
255. Id. at *2–3.
256. Id. at *9–10.
257. 856 N.E.2d 55 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006).
258. Id. at 60–61.
259. BVS, Inc. v. CDW Direct, LLC, 759 F.3d 869, 873 (8th Cir. 2014).
260. BVS, Inc. v. CDW Direct, LLC, 936 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1019, 1026–27 (N.D. Iowa 2013),
rev’d, 759 F.3d 869 (8th Cir. 2014).
261. 759 F.3d 869 (8th Cir. 2014).
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in the transaction at issue required further findings of fact as to the existence of
a course of dealing.262 Another court ruled, without explanation, that “[t]he
warranty provision at issue constituted neither a ‘surprise’ nor a ‘hardship’
within the meaning of section 207(2)(b),” and therefore did not materially alter
the contract.263
2. Warranty Disclaimer Clause Materially Alters
The two courts finding that a disclaimer of warranty provision materially
altered the contract took similar approaches. In Leica Geosystems, Inc. v. L.W.S.
Leasing, Inc.,264 following negotiations and the seller’s sending of price quotes,
the buyer sent a seller a purchase order for helicopter equipment.265 In response,
the seller delivered the equipment and sent an invoice acknowledging delivery
of the equipment.266 Appearing on the invoice was a link to the seller’s websites
concerning its warranty terms, including a disclaimer of warranties.267 Because
the court concluded that a contract was consummated upon the delivery of the
equipment under section 2-204(1) (of Colorado’s corresponding statute),268 it
found that the invoice constituted a confirmation of the parties’ contract and that
the disclaimer was an additional term subject to section 2-207(2)(b).269 The
court relied on precedent stating that disclaimers of warranties “shift the
distribution of risk between the parties” and the language in Comment four that
describing as a material alteration a “clause negating such standard warranties
as that of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose . . . .”270 Without
specifically discussing the facts of the case before it, in Distinctive Cabinetry,
Inc. v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.,271 the court also relied on precedent and
comment three272 in finding that the warranty disclaimer was a material
alteration.273
262. Id. at 873.
263. NIC Holding Corp. v. Lukoil Pan Americas LLC, No. 05 Civ.9372(LAK), 2008 WL
4212462, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2008).
264. 872 F. Supp. 2d 1191 (D. Colo. 2012).
265. Id. at 1194, 1196.
266. Id. at 1196.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 1198. Note that the court did not apply section 2-206(1), which covers contract
formation where a buyer sends a purchase order and the seller ships the goods. U.C.C. § 2-206(1).
The court also avoided the thorny issue of the effect to give to a purported confirmation after the
contract has been formed. See, e.g., Rocheux Int’l of N.J., Inc. v. U.S. Merchants Fin. Grp., Inc.,
741 F. Supp. 2d 651, 677–80 (D.N.J. 2010).
269. Leica Geosystems, Inc. v. L.W.S. Leasing, Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1199–1200 (D.
Colo. 2012).
270. Id. at 1200.
271. No. 08-10233, 2009 WL 1448954 (E.D. Mich. May 22, 2009).
272. The court referred to comment three but comment four refers to warranty disclaimers as
an example of a term that materially alters.
273. Distinctive Cabinetry Inc. v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 08-10233, 2009 WL 1448954,
at *8 (E.D. Mich. May 22, 2009); see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Roadtec, Inc., No. 06747(PGG),
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C. Limited Remedy Clause
A seller will often include a limited remedy and/or a disclaimer of
consequential damages in its terms and conditions. The following is a sample
limited remedy clause that might appear in a seller’s documents:
Limitation. Seller’s total liability and buyer’s exclusive remedy for
any and all losses and damages arising out of any cause whatsoever
related to this agreement under any theory of contract, tort, strict
liability or other legal or equitable theory shall be limited to buyer’s
actual direct damages not to exceed the purchase price of the goods
that caused the damages, or the repair or replacement of such goods.
And in no event shall seller be liable for lost profits, special, incidental,
consequential, or punitive damages.274
U.C.C. section 2-719 regulates the effectiveness of a limited remedy
provision.275
Comment five to section 2-207 specifically identifies a limited remedy
provision as an example of clauses that do not materially alter.276 According to
the comment:
Examples of clauses which involve no element of unreasonable
surprise and which therefore are to be incorporated in the contact
unless notice of objection is seasonably given are . . . a clause limiting
the right of rejection for defects which fall within the customary trade
tolerances for acceptance “with adjustment” or otherwise limiting
remedy in a reasonable manner[.]277
The following discussion reveals that courts have not strictly adhered to the
Comment’s suggestion.
In eleven cases decided between January 1, 2005 and July 1, 2015, courts
addressed whether a limited remedies provision, as an additional term, became
a term of the parties’ contract.278 In three cases, courts ruled that limited
remedies clauses were not material alterations and, therefore, became terms of
the parties’ contracts.279 In four of the cases reviewed, limited remedies

2010 WL 4967979, at *4–6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2010) (finding that a party’s attempt to disclaim
the implied warranty of merchantability was ineffective because the disclaimer was neither
conspicuous nor timely).
274. ASi Indus. GMBH v. MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc., No. 4:06CV951(CDP), 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 10732, at *13–14 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 13, 2008).
275. U.C.C. § 2-719 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
276. See U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 5 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
277. Id.
278. See infra notes 281–85.
279. Pycsa Panama, S.A. v. Tensar Earth Techs., Inc., 625 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1250–51 (S.D.
Fla. 2008); Monarch Nutritional Labs., Inc. v. Maximum Human Performance, Inc., No.
2:03CV474TC, 2005 WL 1683734, at *9 (D. Utah July 18, 2005); Paul Gottlieb & Co. v. Alps
South Corp., 985 So.2d 1, 7–8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
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provisions were deemed to constitute material alterations.280 In three other
cases, courts rejected motions for summary judgment because of the presence of
issues of fact as to whether a limited remedy or disclaimer of consequential
damages materially altered the contract.281 Similarly, the Eighth Circuit stated
that a course of dealing could overcome a buyer’s materiality argument in
regards to additional terms, including limited remedy and disclaimer clauses, but
remanded for further factual findings as to the existence of a course of dealing.282
Finally, section 2-207(2)(b) was inapplicable where a limited remedies clause
became a term of the contract given that it appeared in the seller’s offer, which
was accepted by the buyer.283
1. Limited Remedy Clause Does Not Materially Alter
As was true of disclaimer of warranty clauses, course of dealing was
instrumental in each judicial finding that a limited remedy provision did not
constitute a material alteration. In Pycsa Panama, S.A v. Tensar Earth
Technologies, Inc.,284 and Monarch Nutritional Laboratories, Inc. v. Maximum
Human Performance, Inc.,285 the surprise or hardship test was adopted for
determining materiality.286 The sellers’ repetitive sending of invoices containing
the limited remedy provisions, without objection by the buyer, established a
course of dealings that negated surprise and resulted in holdings that the clauses
did not materially alter the parties’ contracts.287

280. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 401 F.3d 901, 912–13 (8th Cir. 2005);
Leica Geosystems, Inc. v. L.W.S. Leasing, Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1201 (D. Colo. 2012); BVS
Inc. v. CDW Direct, LLC, 936 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1026–27 (N.D. Iowa 2003); Cheboygan Cement
Prods., Inc. v. Glawe, Inc., No. 309745, 2014 WL 2351772, at *10–11 (Mich. Ct. App., May 29,
2014).
281. Keywell, L.L.C. v. Perkinelmer, Inc., No. 11-CV-182-HKS, 2013 WL 4520017, at *7
(W.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2013); Grovenor House, L.L.C. v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., No. 0921698-Civ., 2010 WL 3385344, at *8–9 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 25, 2010); ASi Indus. GMBH v. MEMC
Elec. Materials, Inc., No. 4:06CV951 CDP, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10732, at *5 (E.D. Mo. Feb 13,
2008).
282. BVS, Inc. v. CDW Direct, LLC, 759 F.3d 869, 873 (8th Cir. 2014). For a more detailed
discussion of BVS, see supra text accompanying notes 207–08 (warranty disclaimer discussion).
283. Kalzip, Inc. v. TL Hill Construction, LLC, No. 8:11-cv-01842-T-27/TBM, 2013 WL
1909604, at *4 (M.D. Fla. May 8, 2013).
284. 625 F. Supp. 2d 1198 (S.D. Fla. 2008).
285. No. 2:03CV474TC, 2005 WL 1683734 (D. Utah Jul. 18, 2005).
286. Pycsa Panama, S.A. v. Tensar Earth Techs., Inc., 625 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1250 (S.D. Fla.
2008); Monarch Nutritional Labs., Inc. v. Maximum Human Performance, Inc., No. 2:03CV474TC,
2005 WL 1683734, at *9 (D. Utah July 18, 2005).
287. Pycsa, 625 F. Supp. 2d, at 1250–51 (holding that the seller’s inclusion of limited remedy
provision in at least fourteen invoices sent by the seller in previous transactions with the buyer
established a prior course of dealings); Monarch, 2005 WL 1683734, at *7–8 (holding that a limited
remedy provision in at least twelve copies of terms and conditions, included in pacing paper or with
invoices, established a course of dealings).
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Course of dealings was also influential in Paul Gottlieb & Co. v. Alps South
Corp.,288 where the court adopted the Seventh Circuit’s approach that hardship
is merely a consequence of surprise.289 Nevertheless, it analyzed whether the
inclusion of seller’s additional term, a disclaimer of consequential damages,
would result in surprise or hardship.290 With respect to surprise, the court stated
that the burden of proof was imposed on the non-assenting party—the buyer—
to prove “that under the circumstances it cannot be presumed that a reasonable
merchant would have consented to the additional term.”291 In concluding that
the buyer failed to carry its burden, the court identified facts that included the
parties’ prior dealings—the contract at issue was the sixth in a series between
the two parties, and in each of the previous contracts, the seller’s documents
included the limitation of liability term, which was visible of the face of the
documents.292 The court also noted that the failure of the buyer to have read the
seller’s documents would not, under Florida law, excuse the buyer from being
bound by the terms.293 It also pointed to the language in comment five as support
for its holding.294
The Gottlieb court determined that the record was equally devoid of evidence
of hardship.295 Adopting a test of whether inclusion of the additional term would
“impose substantial economic hardship on the non-assenting party,”296 the court
ruled that the buyer could not sustain its burden by arguing that incorporating
the limitation of liability clause would result in severe economic hardship.297 In
this regard, the court found that the seller never represented that it would
reimburse the buyer for consequential damages sustained because of the seller’s
breach, and the buyer neglected to inform the seller of the potential
consequences of the breach.298
2. Limited Remedy Clause Materially Alters
Courts in two of the three cases, finding that a limited remedy clause was a
material alteration, engaged in a case-by-case analysis. In Marvin Lumber &
Cedar Co. v. PPG Industries, Inc.,299 the Eighth Circuit adopted the surprise or

288. 985 So.2d 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
289. Id. at 7.
290. Id. at 8.
291. Id. at 7.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 8.
296. Id. (quoting Trans−Aire Int’l, Inc. v. N. Adhesive Co., Inc., 882 F.2d 1254 (7th Cir.
1989)).
297. Id. at 8.
298. Id. (quoting Bayway Ref. Co. v. Oxygenated Mktg. & Trading, 215 F.3d 219, 224 (2d
Cir. 2000)).
299. 401 F.3d 901 (8th Cir. 2005).
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hardship test to determine materiality.300 With respect to surprise, the court
rejected the seller’s argument that there could be no surprise because the clause
limiting the buyer’s remedies to the contract price appeared in sixty-six
acknowledgements the seller sent to the buyer.301 Although the clause appeared
in the acknowledgments, the court stated the inclusion of the clause into the
contract would amount to unreasonable surprise because the provision was in
boilerplate language, small print, and was not bargained for. Several witnesses
testified to being subjectively surprised and there was evidence that in the past
the seller and other manufacturers had not strictly enforced the limited remedy
provision.302 As to hardship, the court first ruled that it should be considered
independent of surprise for finding a material alteration.303 The court further
explained that the limited remedy clause would cause a hardship to the nonassenting party because the buyer would not be able to recover the full extent of
the expected remedies otherwise available.304
In Cheboygan Cement Products, Inc. v. Glawe, Inc.,305 the Michigan court
applied a surprise or hardship test for materiality.306 The court concluded the
buyer would suffer a hardship if the contract included the clause limiting the
buyer’s remedy to the contract price and granting only three days after delivery
to discover and identify “exceptions and claims” arising from use of a defective
product.307 A per se approach rather than a case-by-case approach, however,
was taken in Leica Geosys, Inc.,308 where the court summarily resolved the
question of the materiality of a clause disclaiming the buyer’s recovery of
incidental and consequential damages.309 Relying on Colorado precedent, the
court held that the limitation clause was a material alteration of the contract and
as such should not be included in the contract.310
As was true prior to the last decade, courts continue to be split on whether a
limited remedies provision constitutes a material alteration.311 What has
changed, however, is the greater application by courts of a case-by-case
approach in making this determination.312 Consequently, courts are less likely
to rely solely on the language in comment five suggesting that a limited remedy
clause does not materially alter, or alternatively, to assume that because a limited
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.

Id. at 911–12.
Id. at 910, 912.
Id. at 912–13.
Id. at 911 n.6.
Id. at 912.
No. 309745, 2014 WL 2351772 (Mich. Ct. App., May 29, 2014).
Id. at 10.
Id. at 10.
872 F. Supp. 2d 1191 (D. Colo. 2012).
Id. at 1201.
Id.
See supra discussion accompanying notes 278–310.
See id.
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remedy provision holds the potential to significantly shift liability, it constitutes
a material alteration per se.313
D. Interest and Attorney’s Fees Provisions
Sellers commonly incorporate into confirmations, acknowledgments, and
invoices provisions obligating a buyer to pay interest on overdue accounts and
attorneys’ fees incurred in a seller’s efforts to collect payment from a buyer. The
following is a sample pre-judgment interest and attorney’s fee clause that might
appear in a seller’s documents:
Past due accounts are subject to interest charge of 1-1/2% per month,
maximum 18% per annum. Buyer agrees to pay collection costs,
including collection agency fees, reasonable attorney’s fees, and court
costs if this account is placed in collection.314
This survey identified twenty-five cases decided between January 1, 2005 and
July 1, 2015 in which courts determined whether interest and/or attorneys’ fees
provisions materially altered parties’ agreements.315 Courts addressed whether
313. See Murray, supra note 92, at 12 (“[A] number of courts ignore this language and
conclude that such a limitation of remedy clause is a per se material alteration because of its
essential nature in shifting substantial risks to a buyer.”); Ranere, supra note 85, at 680 n.64
(establishing warranty disclaimer and limited remedy provisions as clauses where courts tend to
identify them as materially altering as a matter of law).
314. AFL Fresh & Frozen Fruits & Vegetables, Inc. v. De-Mar Food Servs. Inc., No. 06 Civ.
2142(GEL), 2007 WL 4302514, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2007).
315. Echo, Inc. v. Timberland Machines. & Irrigations, Inc., 661 F.3d 959, 967 (7th Cir. 2011);
Coosemans Specialties, Inc. v. Gargiulo, 485 F.3d 701, 708 (2d Cir. 2007); Tomato Mgmt., Corp.
v. CM Produce LLC, No. 14-CV-3522(JPO), 2014 WL 2893368, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2014);
Hop Hing Produces Inc. v. X & L Supermarket, Inc., No. 2012-1401(ARR)(MDG), 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 47518, at *11–12 (E.D.N.Y. March 4, 2013); Bearden v. Great Lakes Produce and Mktg.
LLC, No. 1:12-CV-700, 2013 WL 2318857 at *2 (W.D. Mich. May 28, 2013); Food Team Int’l,
Ltd. v. Unilink, LLC., 872 F. Supp. 2d 405, 421–22 (E.D. Pa. 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
595 F. App’x 146 (3d Cir. 2014); Rocheux Int’l of N.J., Inc. v. U.S Merchants Fin. Grp. Inc., 741
F. Supp. 2d 651, 676–77 (D.N.J. 2010); Minnesota Elevator, Inc. v. Imperial Elevator Servs., Inc.,
758 F. Supp. 2d 533, 540–41 (N.D. Ill. 2010); Sato & Co. LLC v. S & M Produce, Inc., No. 08-cv7352, 2010 WL 431601, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 2, 2010); Bounty Fresh, LLC v. Paradise Produce,
Inc., No. CV 2009-5577(FB)(MDG), 2010 WL 3781997, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2010); EBMPapst Inc. v. Aeiomed, Inc., No. 09-551 ADM/JJK, 2010 WL 4720848, at *5–6 (D. Minn. Nov. 15,
2010); Jada Toys, Inc. v. Chicago Import, Inc., No.07C699, 2009 WL 3055370, at *7 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 18, 2009); Ger-Nis Int’l, LLC v. FJB, Inc., No.07CV898(CM), 2008 WL 2704384, at *11
(S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2008); Palmareal Produce Corp. v. Direct Produce #1, Inc., No. 07-CV1364(SLT)(RLM), 2008 WL 905041, at *2–3 (E.D.N.Y. March 31, 2008); Argi Exotic Trading,
Inc. v. New Man Designed Sys., Ltd, No. 07-CV-0049 (NG)(MDG), 2008 WL 2397565, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. June 12, 2008); AFL Fresh, 2007 WL 4302514, at *7–8; Smith & Loveless, Inc. v.
Caicos Corp., 471 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1151 (D. Kan. 2007); Brigiotta’s Farmland Produce & Garden
Center, Inc. v. Przykuta, Inc., No. 05-CV-273S, 2006 WL 3240729, at *5–6 (W.D.N.Y. July 13,
2006); Review Video, LLC. v. Enlighten Techs., Inc., No. C04-0123, 2005 WL 91297, at *2–3
(N.D. Iowa Jan. 12, 2005); Top Banana, L.L.C. v. Dom’s Wholesale & Retail Center, Inc., No.
04CV2666(GBD), 2005 WL 1529736, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2005), aff’d, 485 F.3d 701 (2d Cir.
N.Y); Monarch Nutritional Labs., Inc. v. Maximum Human Performance, Inc., No. 2:03CV474TC,

526

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 65:489

interest clauses materially altered the parties’ contracts in twenty of the twentyfive cases.316 In none of the twenty cases did a court find that an interest clause
materially altered the contract. The materiality of attorney’s fees was considered
in twenty of the twenty-five cases reviewed.317 In two of these cases, buyers
successfully convinced courts that attorney’s fee clauses materially altered the
parties’ agreement.318
In each of the cases surveyed, the courts adopted the surprise or hardship
standard for determining if interest or attorney’s fee provisions constitute
material alterations. While articulating this, with a limited number of
exceptions, the tendency was for the court to address only the surprise
component of the test.319 In regard to surprise, several courts acknowledged that
it consists of subjective and objective components.320 As was true of arbitration
provisions, courts imposed the burden of demonstrating surprise or hardship on
the buyer or non-assenting party.321 Courts engaging in more than a superficial

2005 WL 1683734, at *6 (D. Utah July 18, 2005); Dayoub Mktg., Inc. v. S.K. Produce Corp., 04
Civ. 3125 (WHP), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26974, at *14–17 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2005);
ConocoPhillips v. Williams Alaska Petroleum, 322 P.3d 114, 121–22 (Alaska 2014); A.E.
Robinson Oil Co., Inc. v. County Forest Prods., Inc., 40 A.3d 20, 23 (Me. 2012); Serge Dore’
Selections Ltd. v. Universal Wines & Spirits, 20 Misc.3d 1121(A), 11–12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008).
316. Tomato, 2014 WL 2893368, at *2–3; ConocoPhillips, 322 P.3d 114 at 141; Hop Hing,
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47518, at *10–12; A.E. Robinson, 40 A.3d at 23; Food Team, 872 F. Supp.
2d at 420; Echo, 661 F.3d at 966–67; Rocheux, 741 F. Supp. 2d at 680–81; Bounty Fresh, 2010 WL
3781997, at *2–3; Minnesota Elevator, 758 F. Supp. 2d at 540; Jada Toys, 2009 WL 3055370, at
*7–8; Ger-Nis, 2008 WL 2704384, at *11; Argi, 2008 WL 2397565, at *3; Palmareal, 2008 WL
905041, at *3; Smith & Loveless, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 1151; AFL Fresh, 2007 WL 4302514;
Brigiotta’s, 2006 WL 3240729, at *5–6; Review Video, 2005 WL 91297, at *2; Dayoub, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 26974, at *14–16; Top Banana, 2005 WL 1529736; Monarch, 2005 WL 1683734, at
*6.
317. Coosemans, 485 F.3d at 708; Tomato, 2014 WL 2893368, at *2; Hop Hing, 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 47519, at *11–12; Bearden, 2013 WL 2318857, at *2; A.E. Robinson, 40 A.3d at 23;
Food Team, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 419–20; Rocheux, 741 F. Supp. 2d at 676–77; EBM-Papst, 2010
WL 4720848, at *5–6; Bounty Fresh, 2010 WL 3781997, at *3–4; Sato, 2010 WL 431601, at *5;
Jada Toys, 2009 WL 3055370, at *7–8; Ger-Nis, 2008 WL 2704384, at *11–12; Serge Dore’, 20
Misc.3d 1121(A) at *11–12; Argi, 2008 WL 2397565, at *3; Palmareal, 2008 WL 905041, at *2–
-3; Smith & Loveless, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 1151–52; AFL Fresh, 2007 WL 4302514, at *7–8;
Brigiotta’s, 2006 WL 3240729, at *5–6; Dayoub, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26974, at 14–17; Top
Banana, 2005 WL 1529736, at *5.
318. Food Team, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 422; A.E. Robinson, 40 A.3d at 23–24.
319. See, e.g., EBM-PABST, 2010 WL 4720848, at *6; Bearden, 2013 WL 2318857, at *2–3;
Top Banana, 2005 WL 1529736, at *5.
320. See, e.g., Coosemans, 485 F.3d at 708; AFL Fresh, 2007 WL 4302514, at *8 (stating that
surprise includes subjective and objective elements); Top Banana, 2005 WL 1529736, at *5
(finding the buyer failed to present evidence to demonstrate subjective or objective surprise or
hardship).
321. See, e.g., Coosemans, 485 F.3d at 708; Bearden, 2013 WL 2318857, at *3.
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analysis also accepted the notion that determinations of material alteration
should be made on a case-by-case basis.322
1. Pre-Judgment Interest Clause
In assessing the materiality of an interest clause as an additional term, courts
generally adopted the surprise or hardship standard for material alteration.323
These courts rarely, however, engaged in more than a superficial analysis.
Rather, they tended to summarily reject buyers’ material alteration argument,
adopting something akin to a per se rule in finding interest clauses did not
materially alter.324 In adopting this approach, courts relied on the language in
comment five to section 2-207, which states that clauses that do not involve
unreasonable surprise include “a clause providing for interest or overdue
invoices.”325 These courts also relied on precedent,326 the existence of a course

322. See, e.g., Bearden, 2013 WL 2318857, at *3 (stating that whether an additional term
materially alters a contract depends on the facts of each case).
323. See, e.g., A.E. Robinson, 40 A.3d at 23–24; Top Banana, 2005 WL 1529736, at *5; Review
Video, 2005 WL 91297, at *2–3 (relying on comment five and also stating that a clause calling for
interest on past due accounts even if substantially greater than the default interest rate does not give
rise to unreasonable surprise). But see, Rocheux Int’l of N.J., Inc. v. U.S Merchants Fin. Grp., Inc.,
741 F. Supp. 2d 651, 682–85 (D.N.J. 2010) (applying the surprise or hardship test, but
acknowledging that questions have been raised as to whether hardship is an independent basis for
establishing a material alteration).
324. See A.E. Robinson, 40 A.3d at 23; Top Banana, 2005 WL 1529736, at *5.
325. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 5 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002); see Echo, Inc. v.
Timberland Machs. & Irrigations, Inc., 661 F.3d 959, 967 (7th Cir. 2011); Tomato Mgmt., Corp.
v. CM Produce LLC, No. 14-CV-3522(JPO), 2014 WL 2893368, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2014);
Food Team Int’l, Ltd. v. Unilink, LLC, 872 F. Supp. 2d 405, 421 (E.D. Pa. 2012); Jada Toys, Inc.
v. Chicago Imp., Inc., No. 07C699, 2009 WL 3055370, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 2009 (finding a
prior course of dealing whereby the seller included the interest provision into invoices in hundreds
of previous transactions between the parties); Brigiotta’s Farmland Produce & Garden Center, Inc.
v. Przykuta, Inc., No. 05-CV-273S, 2006 WL 3240729, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. July 13, 2006); Dayoub
Mktg, Inc. v. S.K. Produce Corp., No. 04 Civ. 3125(WHP), 2005 WL 3006032, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 9, 2005); Review Video, 2005 WL 91297, at *2–3 (relying on comment five and also stating
that a clause calling for interest on past due accounts even if substantially greater than the default
interest rate does not give rise to unreasonable surprise); see also Ger-Nis Int’l, LCC v. FJB, Inc.,
No. 07CV898(CM), 2008 WL 2704384, at *15–16 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2008) (adopting the rule
articulated in Dayoub that interest provisions do not materially alter the contract in regards to
several defendants, but remanding for consideration of whether one buyer objected to the clause);
A.E. Robinson, 40 A.3d at 23 (relying on the language in comment five in finding no material
alteration but also finding a prior course of dealing supported including an interest provision in the
parties’ contract).
326. See, e.g., Hop Hing Produces Inc. v. X & L Supermarket, Inc., No. CV 20121401(ARR)(MDG), 2013 WL 1232919, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. March 4, 2013); Echo, Inc., 661 F.3d at
967; Minnesota Elevator, Inc. v. Imperial Elevator Servs., Inc., 758 F. Supp. 2d 533, 540–41 (N.D.
Ill. 2010).
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of dealings,327 and the buyer’s failure to either proffer evidence of or to plead
surprise or hardship.328
2. Attorney’s Fees Clause
Courts’ approaches varied in the twenty cases reviewed in which the
materiality of an attorney’s fee clause was disputed. In several instances, courts
summarily rejected buyers’ surprise or hardship arguments relating to an
attorney’s fee clause, although less often than for interest provisions.329 This
was particularly true when the subject matter of the contract involved
perishables and thereby implicated the Perishables Agricultural Commodities
Act (“PACA”), which has been interpreted to allow for the recovery of
reasonable attorney’s fees where the parties’ contract so provides.330 Courts
addressing this issue determined that the PACA undercuts buyers’ unreasonable
surprise argument.331 In five cases, the non-assenting party (the buyer) failed to
present any evidence in support of their claim of or to plead surprise or
hardship.332
Course of dealing figured prominently in four cases rejecting buyers’
arguments that an attorney’s fee provision was a material alteration.333 In
327. See, e.g., Rocheux Int’l of N.J., Inc. v. U.S Merchants Fin. Grp. Inc., 741 F. Supp. 2d 651,
683–84 (D.N.J. 2010) (establishing that the seller’s sending of hundreds of invoices containing an
interest clause constituted a prior course of dealing sufficient to overcome the buyer’s surprise or
hardship claim); Jada Toys, 2009 WL 3055370, at *8.
328. See, e.g., Bounty Fresh, LLC v. Paradise Produce, Inc., No. CV 2009-5577(FB)(MDG),
2010 WL 3781997, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2010); Argi Exotic Trading, Inc. v. New Man
Designed Sys., Ltd., 2008 WL 2397565, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. June 12, 2008); Smith & Loveless v.
Caicos Corp., 471 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1152 (D. Kan. 2007); AFL Fresh & Frozen Fruits & Vegetable,
Inc. v. De-Mar Food Servs. Inc., No. 06 Civ. 2142(GEL), 2007 WL 4302514, at *7–8 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 2007) (addressing a situation where the buyer failed to raise issue of material alteration); Serge
Dore’ Selections Ltd. v. Universal Wines and Spirits, 20 Misc. 3d 1121(A), No.23509/2007, at *12
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008) (finding that a buyer cannot establish surprise when they previously signed
an invoice containing a provision providing for attorney’s fees).
329. See Tomato, 2014 WL 2893368 at *2; Palmareal Produce Corp. v. Direct Produce #1,
Inc., No. 07-CV-1364, 2008 WL 905041, at *3–4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2008).
330. See, e.g., Coosemans Specialties, Inc. v. Gargiulo, 485 F.3d 701, 709 (2d Cir. 2007);
Tomato, 2014 WL 2893368, at *2; Hop Hing, 2013 WL 1232919 at *4; Palmareal, 2008 WL
905041, at *2–3; Ger-Nis, 2008 WL 2704384, at *11–12; (adopting rule articulated in Dayoub that
a provision calling for attorney’s fees in cases implicating the PACA does not materially alter the
contract); Dayoub Mktg., Inc. v. S.K. Produce Corp., No. 04 Civ. 3125(WHP), 2005 WL 3006032,
at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2005); Top Banana, L.L.C. v. Dom’s Wholesale & Retail Center, Inc., No.
04 CV 2666(GBD), 2005 WL 1529736, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2005).
331. Coosemans, 485 F.3d at 708–09.
332. Coosemans, 485 F.3d at 708; Bounty Fresh, 2010 WL 3781997, at *2–3; Argi, 2008 WL
2397565, at *3–4; AFL Fresh, 2007 WL 4302514, at *7–8 (buyer failed to raise issue of material
alteration); Top Banana, 2005 WL 1529736, at *5.
333. Bearden v. Great Lakes Produce and Mktg. LLC, No. 1:12-CV-700, 2013 WL 2318857,
at *3–4 (W.D. Mich. May 28, 2013); Rocheux Int’l of N.J., Inc. v. U.S. Merchants Fin. Grp., Inc.,
741 F. Supp. 2d 651, 683–84 (D.N.J. 2010); Jada Toys, Inc. v. Chicago Import, Inc., No. 07C699,
2009 WL 3055370, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 2009).
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Rocheux Int’l of N.J., Inc. v. U.S. Merchants,334 a seller sought to recover interest
and attorney’s fees arising from a buyer’s wrongful failure to pay for a
product.335 The seller asserted it was entitled to recover these expenses based
on provisions in invoices it sent to the buyer.336 The terms provided for an 18%
annual interest rate and attorney’s fees equaling 25% of the buyer’s outstanding
balance.337
After adopting the surprise or hardship standard and citing to comments four
and five of section 2-207, the court enumerated several factors that courts
examine in determining whether including an additional term in a contract would
constitute an unreasonable surprise.338 These included the parties’ course of
dealing, industry standards, the conspicuousness of the additional terms in the
confirmation, and whether the terms appeared in the non-assenting party’s
standard terms.339 The court found that the seller’s inclusion of the disputed
terms in hundreds of invoices and credit memos over a six-year period was
sufficient to establish a course of dealing and to counter the buyer’s surprise
argument.340 The court in Bearden v. Great Lakes Produce and Marketing
LLC341 articulated the four factors expressed in Rocheux to determine whether
an attorney’s fee clause was a material alteration.342 In concluding the clause
had not materially altered, the court noted that the buyer had failed to “establish
that there is an absence of industry custom” of seller’s including attorney’s fee
provisions in their forms.343
Few cases addressed the question of whether an attorney’s fees provision
gives rise to an undue hardship.344 One of the more extensive discussions of this
issue occurred in Rocheux.345 There, the court acknowledged the cases in which
courts have ruled that hardship is not an independent ground for finding a
material alteration.346 Finding the reasoning underlying this view to be
persuasive, the court proceeded to address whether including the interest and
334. 741 F. Supp. 2d 651 (D.N.J. 2010).
335. Id. at 658.
336. Id. at 658–59.
337. Id. at 681.
338. See id. at 682.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 683.
341. No. 1:12-CV-700, 2013 WL 2318857 (W.D. Mich. May 28, 2013).
342. Id. at *3.
343. Id. at *4.
344. See Bearden, 2013 WL 2318857, at *6 (“[A]ttorney’s fees may impose . . . some
economic hardship, but economic hardship is not equivalent to an undue hardship.”); Rocheux, 741
F. Supp. 2d at 684–85, 687; Dayoub Mktg., Inc. v. S.K. Produce Corp., No. 04 Civ. 3125 (WHP),
2005 WL 3006032, at *5–6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2005) (finding that collection costs, including
interest on unpaid balances and attorney’s fees, did not constitute an undue hardship; the court
reduced the seller’s recovery of attorney’s fees to an amount that was reasonable).
345. See Rocheux, 741 F. Supp. 2d at 684.
346. Id.
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attorney’s fee clause was a material alteration.347 In rejecting the buyer’s
argument that the 18% interest rate exceeded the 16% rate imposed by the usury
statute, the court concluded the rate did not substantially exceed the 16% usury
rate and buyer’s presented no evidence it was outside the range of interest
charged in the trade.348 The court also noted section 2-207’s comment five.
Turning to the attorney’s fee provision, the court found that given the protracted
nature of the litigation between the parties, it could not conclude that the 25%
rate would be more onerous than if the term had merely called for the award of
reasonable attorney’s fees.349 Thus, the buyer had not established hardship to
support that the provision materially altered the contract.350 In another case
discussing course of dealing, interest and attorney’s fee provisions in hundreds
of invoices sent by the seller over several years supported a court’s finding of
no surprise.351
In only two of the cases surveyed did courts find that an attorney’s fees
provision constituted a material alteration.352 In A.E. Robinson Oil Co. v. County
Forest Prods. Inc.,353 the seller’s inclusion of an interest provision on its
invoices over several years was determined to be a course of dealing that
supported including the provision in the parties’ contract.354 The court held,
however, that the attorney’s fees clause was a material alteration.355 This was
based on the absence of evidence of course of dealing because the invoices did
not contain language providing for the recovery of attorney’s fees.356 In Food
Team Intern, Ltd. v. Unilink, LLC,357 the court found that a provision requiring
the buyer to pay “all attorneys’ fees,” lacked sufficient qualifying language to
limit the buyer’s potential exposure and thus was a material alteration.”358
Unlike the other clauses discussed thus far, courts applied something close to
a per se approach in finding that pre-judgment interest clauses do not materially
alter. While courts were influenced by the language in comment five, the rule
adopted may be a consequence of courts’ sense that a buyer should reasonably
expect that it will be responsible for paying pre-judgment interest if it defaults

347. Id.
348. Id. at 658.
349. Id. at 686–87.
350. Id.
351. See Jada Toys, Inc. v. Chicago Import, Inc., No. 07C699, 2009 WL 3055370, at *8–9
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 2009).
352. See Food Team Int’l, Ltd. v. Unilink, LLC, 872 F. Supp. 2d 504, 420–21 (E.D. Pa. 2012);
A.E. Robinson Oil Co. v. County Forest Prods. Inc., 40 A.3d 20, 23–24 (Me. 2012).
353. 40 A.3d 20 (Me. 2012).
354. Id. at 23 (determining that comment five supported the conclusion that an interest charge
provision did not materially alter the parties contract).
355. Id.
356. Id. at 23–24.
357. 872 F. Supp. 2d 405 (E.D. Pa. 2012).
358. Food Team Int’l, Ltd. v. Unilink, LLC, 872 F. Supp. 2d 405, 421–22 (E.D. Pa. 2012).
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in its obligation to pay for goods delivered.359 Although courts are less likely to
adopt a per se approach in regard to attorney’s fees, here too they may be
influenced by the belief that the obligation to pay costs of collection, upon
default, is not something that should surprise a buyer.
E. Forum Selection Clauses
Parties often include clauses in their documents that stipulate the venue in
which a matter will be adjudicated in the event of a dispute. The following is an
example of a forum selection clause that appeared in a seller’s document, titled
as a sales contract, which accepted a buyer’s offer to purchase: “Buyer agrees
that any dispute arising out of this agreement shall be resolved in the Superior
Court of New Jersey, Camden County, or the Federal District Court for the
District of New Jersey and buyer does agree to submit generally to the
jurisdiction of these courts.”360
This survey identified thirty cases decided over the last decade in which courts
determined whether a forum selection clause constitutes a material alteration. In
all but seven of the cases reviewed, courts found that a forum selection clause
was an additional term that materially altered the parties’ contract and, therefore,
refused to permit it to become a term of the agreement.
1. Forum Selection Clause Does Not Materially Alter
Course of dealing played a role in cases in which courts found that a forum
selection clause did not materially alter the contract. In Bell, Inc. v. IFS
Industries, Inc.,361 over an eight-year period, the seller repeatedly sent invoices
that included terms and conditions containing a forum selection clause to which
the buyer did not object, which established a course of dealing that overcame the
buyer’s materiality argument.362 Likewise, in CFMOTO Powersports Inc. v.
NNR Global Logistics USA, Inc.,363 TSR Silicon Resources, Inc. v. Broadway
Com Corp.364, and Liquid Magnetix Corp. v. Therma-Stor LLC365, the sellers’
repeated sending of forms containing forum selection clauses created a course
of dealing sufficient to rebut the buyers’ materiality arguments.366 In cases in

359. See, e.g., Rocheux Int’l of N.J., Inc. v. U.S. Merchants Fin. Grp., Inc., 741 F. Supp. 2d
651, 685–86 (D.N.J. 2010).
360. Metro. Alloys Corp. v. State Metals Indus., 416 F. Supp. 2d 561, 565 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
361. 742 F. Supp. 2d 1049 (D.S.D. 2010).
362. See id. at 1053.
363. No. 09-2202(JRT/JJK), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113058 (D. Minn. Dec. 4, 2009).
364. No. 9419(NRB), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92121 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2007).
365. No. 12-CV-3151-WJM-KMT, 2014 WL 1389984 (D. Colo. Apr. 9, 2014).
366. Liquid Magnetix, 2014 WL 1389984, at *2, *4 (twelve invoices established a course of
dealing); CFMOTO Powersports, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113058, at *14–18 (finding that terms
and conditions attached to 224 invoices, each of which contained a forum selection clause,
established course of dealing); TSR Silicon Resources, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92121, at *11–12
(75 seller’s invoices, which included a forum selection clause sent to a buyer over a five-year
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which courts found that forum selection clauses materially alter contracts, courts
suggested that they would have reached a different result if a prior course of
dealing was present.367
In Quality Wood Designs, Inc. v. Ex-Factory, Inc.,368 course of dealing was
one of several factors369 the court identified as important in determining whether
a forum selection clause constituted a surprise or hardship that would give rise
to a material alteration.370 Adopting this fact-based approach, the court found
there was no course of dealing.371 Nevertheless, it concluded the forum selection
clause was not a material alteration.372 The court relied on the following facts
in concluding that the buyer should not have been surprised by the provision:
the seller sent an invoice containing the forum selection clause to the buyer’s
president the day after the oral agreement was made; the conspicuousness of the
relevant terms and conditions; and the buyer’s failure to object to the clause
despite objecting to other terms.373 As for hardship, the court concluded it refers
to “something other than a debate over the advantage of one’s home forum or
convenience of litigation in one’s home state.”374 In addition, the court found
that the buyer could foresee that any dispute between the parties could be
litigated in either North Carolina or South Dakota.375 In another case, in which
a court concluded a forum selection clause did not materially alter the contract,
the court found that the buyer’s assent to the forms containing the forum
selection clauses defeated any materiality argument.376
2. Forum Selection Clause Materially Alters
In contrast to arbitration, warranty disclaimer, limited remedy and attorney’s
fee provisions, courts assessing the materiality of forum selection clauses rarely
discussed the surprise or hardship standard. Rather, they took an approach
period, established a course of dealing that placed the buyer on notice and rebutted its claim that
the forum selection clause materially altered the parties’ contract).
367. Ben-Trei Overseas, LLC v. Gerdau Ameristeel US, Inc., No. 09-CV-153-TCK-TLW,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11792, at *14, *19 (N.D. Okla. Feb. 10, 2010); Vanlab Corp. v. Blossom
Valley Foods Corp., 04-CV-6183, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10869, at *6–9 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 10,
2005).
368. 40 F. Supp. 3d 1137 (D.S.D. 2014).
369. The other factors included when, during the transaction, and how the proposed term was
sent, to whom it was sent and whether the term was unusual. Id. at 1151.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 1150–51.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Id. at 1153.
375. Id.
376. See Highland Supply Corp. v. Kurt Weiss Greenhouses, Inc, No. 08-859-GPM, 2009 WL
2365244, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 28, 2009); see also Hardwire, LCC v. Zero Int’l., Inc., No. 14-54LPS-CJB, 2014 WL 5144610, at *12–13 (D. Del. Oct. 14, 2014) (finding that a forum selection
clause did not materially alter the contract because section 2-207(1) instead of section 2-207(2)(b)
was applicable where the clause was in the offer).
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similar to that adopted by courts in assessing the materiality of interest clauses,
but reached the opposite conclusion in summarily accepting the non-assenting
party’s argument that a forum selection clause constitutes a material alteration.
Most courts simply restated what was cast as the majority rule and turned to
precedent in concluding, with cursory discussion, that a forum selection clause
constitutes a material alteration.377 The paucity of analysis is exemplified by
courts’ tendencies in several cases to not even articulate surprise or hardship as
the applicable test.378
A facts-based approach, however, was applied in Duro Textiles, LLC v.
Sunbelt Corp.379 where the court concluded the forum selection clause materially
altered the contract.380 In a few instances, courts also articulated a rationale for
finding that a forum selection clause is a material alteration.381 This occurred in
Metropolitan Alloys Corp. v. State Metal Industries, Inc.,382 where the court
stated a rationale that suggests materiality is derived from hardship:
There are still subtle differences between the courts in various states.
Certainly the jurors are selected from different economic, political and
social backgrounds, which may affect their attitudes even in
commercial matters. Counsel other than the party’s regular attorney
may be needed, at additional expense. The bench and bar has always

377. See Bent Glass Design v. Scienstry, Inc., No. 13-4282, 2014 WL 550548, at *9 (E.D. Pa.
Feb. 12, 2014); Barrette Outdoor Living, Inc. v. Vi-Chem Corp., No. 2:13-CV-289, slip op. at 3–4
(E.D. Tenn. July 21, 2014); Compass Automotive Grp., LLC v. Denso Mfg. Tennessee, Inc., No.
12-10919, 2013 WL 655112, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 22, 2013); J.D. Fields, Inc. v. Indep. Enters.,
Inc., No. 4:12-CV-2605, 2012 WL 5818229, at *6–7 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 2012); Armstrong Pumps,
Inc. v. The Brewer-Garrett Co., No. 08-CV-911A, 2010 WL 447394, at *3–4 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 2,
2010); Saint Francis Home Med. Equip. v. Sunrise Med. HHG, Inc., No.08-CV-224-TCK-PJC,
2009 WL 2461327, at *9 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 10, 2009); Statewide Aquastore, Inc. v. Pelseal Techs.,
LLC., No. 5:06-CV-93 (FJS/GHL), 2008 WL 1902207, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2008); DTE
Energy Techs., Inc., v. Briggs Elec., Inc., No. 06-12347, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13523, at *21
(E.D. Mich. Feb. 28, 2007); Triad Int’l Maint. Corp. v. AIM Aviation, Inc., 473 F. Supp. 2d 666,
670–71 n.2 (M.D.N.C. 2006); Metro. Alloys v. State Metals Indus., 416 F. Supp. 2d 561, 567 (E.D.
Mich. 2006); Belanger, Inc., v. Car Wash Consultants, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 2d 761, 765–66 (E.D.
Mich. 2006); C. Mahendra (NY), LLC v. Nat’l Gold & Diamond Ctr., Inc., 3 N.Y.S.3d 27, 30 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2015); Tacoma Fixture Co., Inc. v. Rudd Co., 174 P.3d 721, 724–25 n.4 (Wash. Ct. App.
2008); Posh Pooch, Inc. v. Argenti, 11 Misc. 3d 1055(A), No. 106419/2005, slip op. at 2–3 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2006); Lively v. Ijam, Inc., 114 P.3d 487, 493 (Okla. Civ. App. 2005); see also Office
Supply Store.com v. Kan. City. Sch. Bd., 334 S.W.3d 574, 580–81 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011) (dictum).
378. But see Ben-Trei Overseas, LLC v. Gerdau Ameristeel US, Inc., No. 09-CV-153-TCKTLW, 2010 Dist. LEXIS 1172, at *19 (N.D. Okla. Feb. 10, 2010).
379. 12 F. Supp. 3d 221 (D. Mass. 2014).
380. Id. at 224.
381. Constr. Res. Grp., Inc. v. Gen. Technoligies, Inc., No. 7:13-1695-TMC, 2013 WL
6284003, at *3 (D.S.C. Dec. 4, 2013); Tra Indus., Inc. v. Valspar Corp., No. CV-10-026-JLO, 2010
WL 2854251, at *5 (E.D. Wash. July 19, 2010); Steel Dynamic, Inc. v. Big River Zinc Corp., No.
1:06-CV-00110, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38533, at *14–15 (N.D. Ind. June 9, 2006); Orkal Indus.,
LLC v. Array Connector Corp., 97 A.D.3d 555, 556 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012).
382. 416 F. Supp. 2d 561 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
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regarded choice of forum as a significant right. The Court, as a matter
of common sense would regard the injection of a choice of forum
clause as a proposal for a material alteration in the contact, and
believes that while the argument is not as strong as in the case of an
arbitration clause, the rationale is the same.383
The Metropolitan court’s reference to arbitration provisions is troublesome
because it, like other cases finding that a forum selection clause materially alters
a contract, relies on precedent that analogized forum selection clauses to
arbitration provisions, which at the time were more likely than not to be viewed
as material alterations.384 The court’s reliance on such precedent seems
unwarranted particularly given the shift in analysis concerning the materiality of
arbitration provisions.385
IV. CONCLUSION
Likely, section 2-207 will continue to mystify and be the object of derision.
Yet over the past decade, judicial developments regarding what constitutes a
material alteration may have furthered Section 2-207(2)(b)’s purpose—
preventing a party’s use of an additional term in its standardized form to
reallocate risks beyond those proposed in the offer and thus not binding a party
to terms it could not reasonably have expected to be a term of their contract.386
This has been realized through the judiciary’s increased willingness to adopt a
facts-based rather than a per se approach to assess the materiality of additional
terms—a welcome departure by many courts from strict adherence to the
examples set forth in official comments four and five to determine when an
additional term constitutes a material alteration. This approach allows courts to
examine the peculiarities of each case to determine if a clause materially alters
based on both the subjective or objective circumstances surrounding the
transaction and to permit the inclusion of terms that are fair and that conform to
the probable intentions of parties who don’t necessarily read the boilerplate
terms of the other party’s forms.387
Nevertheless, concerns remain, including deciding in which instances
repeated use of a term in documents constitutes a course of dealing and the
frequency of per se determinations regarding the materiality of forum selection
clauses. Currently too many courts’ appear predisposed to assume a course of
dealing based simply on the party’s repeated sending of forms containing the
disputed additional term. Moreover, courts’ frequent failure to engage in a factrich examination of forum selection clauses undermines efforts to determine if
383. Id. at 567.
384. See, e.g., Posh Pooch, Inc. v. Argenti, 11 Misc. 3d 1055(A), No. 106419/2005, slip. op.
at 2–3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006) (finding the forum selection clause as a material alteration, the court
relied on a 1978 case, in which a court found that an arbitration provision was a material alteration).
385. See supra discussion accompanying notes 163–225.
386. Murray, supra note 92, at 46.
387. See Brown, supra note 53, at 935, 937–38.
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a non-assenting party would genuinely be surprised or suffer the adverse
economic consequence that represent hardship if such a provision is included in
the party’s agreement. Notwithstanding such shortcomings, courts’ willingness
over the past decade to alter their approach to questions involving section 2207(2)(b) suggests the possibility that courts will eventually directly address the
remaining issues.
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